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INTRODUCTION 
he common-law “apparent consent” standard has been criticized 
for allowing offenders to escape liability for sexual assault when 
the victim was too intoxicated or scared to say “no.”1 This Comment 
analyzes how Oregon’s “abuse of a vulnerable person” statute could 
apply to such cases2—namely, civil cases in which the plaintiff was 
sexually assaulted by an acquaintance, and she was unable to express 
her nonconsent or consciously perceive the assault, due to intoxication 
or underlying trauma (i.e., “date rape” cases).3 Herein I argue the 
1 See, e.g., Our Demands, OUR HARVARD CAN DO BETTER, https:// 
ourharvardcandobetter.wordpress.com/our-demands/ [https://perma.cc/4JQR-KSZV] (last 
visited Dec. 27, 2018) (listing the first two of six demands in the organization’s effort to 
dismantle “rape culture at Harvard” as (1) Harvard must adopt an “affirmative consent” 
policy, and (2) “mental incapacitation” as used in Harvard’s current policy must be 
clarified); Noah J. Delwiche & Andrew M. Duehren, Caught Between Criticisms, CRIMSON 
(May 28, 2015), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2015/5/28/caught-between-criticisms-
title-ix/ [https://perma.cc/63M3-KPP5] (calling for affirmative consent policy to replace 
existing implied consent policy); Sexual Harassment & Rape Prevention Program, Wildcats 
Get Consent, UNIV. OF N.H., https://www.unh.edu/sharpp/wildcats-get-consent [https:// 
perma.cc/2RLK-ZZCX] (last visited Dec. 28, 2018) (implementing expressed consent 
policy) [hereinafter UNIV. OF N.H.]. See generally Charlene Y. Senn et al., Efficacy of a 
Sexual Assault Resistance Program for University Women, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2326, 
2326–27 (2015) (developing an acquaintance-rape reduction program that partly focuses on 
teaching women to express nonconsent); Emily Bazelon, The Return of the Sex Wars, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/13/magazine/the-return-of-the-
sex-wars.html [https://perma.cc/6PTG-Y23Q] (quoting Jessica Fournier of the survivor 
group Our Harvard Can Do Better) (decrying such programs’ focus on women’s behavior 
as failing to address men’s behavior: namely, having sex with women “so incapacitated they 
can’t stand up or use their words”). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 16 cmt. g 
(AM. LAW. INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2018) (“No cases have been found that consider 
whether the affirmative-consent standard that some jurisdictions apply in criminal law and 
student-disciplinary cases applies in tort law. Moreover, there are plausible arguments on 
both sides of this debate. Accordingly, this restatement takes no official position on whether 
affirmative consent should be the standard for consent to sexual intercourse or 
penetration.”).  
2 See generally OR. REV. STAT. §§ 124.100–40 (2018) (Oregon’s “abuse of a vulnerable 
person” statute). 
3 This Comment focuses on date rape because of the legal issues survivors face and 
argues that Oregon statutory law can be used to avoid some of these legal issues and find a 
T 
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statute is useful for these plaintiffs who face obstacles to recovery 
under the common-law rules. The statute offers several advantages 
over the common law: 
• a potentially easier path when the perpetrator claims he did not
realize the plaintiff’s lack of consent; 
• a more generous damages award with mandatory treble
damages; 
• a potentially more expansive theory for holding third parties
liable; and 
• a longer statute of limitations (seven years instead of two years).
The differences between the common law and the statutory cause of 
action are explored in Part I, which compares the statute’s rules to the 
rules for common-law battery in the date rape context. Part II argues 
that the statute should be interpreted to apply to date rape claims. 
Finally, Part III considers some of the statute’s potential limitations in 
the context of governmental liability. 
I 
LIVING IN A DUAL INTENT STATE 
A. Why Battery Fails Survivors: Dual Intent 
Plaintiffs pursuing date rape claims in Oregon may be unable to 
recover in tort law for battery. In Oregon, a defendant commits battery 
when he (1) intentionally (2) causes (3) an unconsented (4) sexual 
civil remedy. Although this Comment does focus on legal remedies, the author recognizes 
that legal remedies alone, whether civil or criminal, are an insufficient response to the 
current issues surrounding sexual assault.  
Furthermore, the hypothetical illustrations employed in this Comment place the actors in 
a variety of gender roles. Likewise, the rule statements in this Comment will employ a 
variety of gender pronouns to bring attention to the fact that neither victims nor offenders 
are limited to one gender. At the same time, the evenly balanced gender roles reflected in 
the hypotheticals and rule statements do not reflect the statistical reality that 
90% of victims are women. See OR. ATT’Y GEN.’S SEXUAL ASSAULT TASK FORCE, 
SEXUAL ASSAULT RESPONSE TEAM (SART) HANDBOOK 1 (3d version 2009) [hereinafter 
SART HANDBOOK]. The literary device is merely a function of the author’s attempt to be 
inclusive. Relatedly, note that the hypothetical actors are not necessarily cisgender or 
transgender.  
Finally, the discussion below, with its illustrations of sexual assault, may trigger some 
readers. If such a discussion might trigger you, please consider discussing your plans to read 
this Comment with a therapist or trusted friend before you read it. With that being said, the 
hypotheticals below somewhat euphemistically employ “fervent kissing” in place of more 
graphic sexual assaults to minimize triggering readers. This literary device, therefore, is not 
employed to make light of sexual assaults.  
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contact with the plaintiff.4 Oregon is a dual intent state.5 Therefore, the 
defendant must desire harm or offense or know that the contact will 
occur and is substantially certain to be harmful or offensive.6  
The dual intent rule can make a battery action difficult for some 
plaintiffs who are injured by date rape.7 Indeed, courts and scholars 
have widely criticized the dual intent rule for this very reason. Prosser, 
in his famous “kissing man” illustration,8 spelled out how the dual 
intent rule protects the defendant who is oblivious or delusional about 
the victim’s lack of consent. The Restatement (Third) of Torts offers 
the following illustration in support of the critique: “Sexual boor Boris, 
on his first date with Pauline, suddenly kisses her fervently, and 
continues to do so despite her verbal protests. Boris hears her protests 
but ignores them because he subjectively believes that her protests are 
insincere and that she actually consents.”9 Here, Boris honestly (though 
very unreasonably) did not realize the offensive nature of his actions.10 
4 See OR. UNIF. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 40.02 (2017). 
5 See McGanty v. Staudenraus, 321 Or. 532, 550–51, 901 P.2d 841, 852–53 (1995) 
(analyzing intentional infliction of emotional distress and adopting Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 8A’s definition of intent); see also Cook v. Kinzua Pine Mills Co., 207 Or. 34, 
48–49, 293 P.2d 717, 723–24 (1956); Johnson v. Jones, 269 Or. App. 12, 17, 344 P.3d 89, 
92 (2015). As to the defendant’s intent, some states have a “single intent rule”; other states 
have a “dual intent rule.” DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 35 (2d ed. 2015), 
Westlaw (database updated June 2019) [hereinafter DOBBS]. 
6 See Staudenraus, 321 Or. at 550–51, 901 P.2d at 852–53 (“The word ‘intent’ is used 
throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote that the actor desires to cause 
consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain 
to result from it.”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (AM. LAW. INST. 
1965)); OR. UNIF. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 40.06. 
7 See OR. UNIF. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 40.06; DOBBS, supra note 5, § 35. 
8 PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, 41–42 
(5th ed. 1984). “[A] man who decides to flatter a woman he spots in a crowd with an 
unpetitioned-for kiss, one of the examples of battery Prosser provides, would find no 
objection under the Wagners’ proposed [dual intent] rule so long as his intentional contact 
was initiated with no intent to injure or offend. He would be held civilly liable for his 
conduct only if he intended to harm or offend her through his kiss. A woman in such 
circumstances would not enjoy the presumption of the law in favor of preserving her bodily 
integrity; instead, her right to be free from physical contact with strangers would depend 
upon whether she could prove that the stranger hoped to harm or offend her through his 
contact. So long as he could show that he meant only flattery and the communication of 
positive feelings toward her in stroking her, kissing her, or hugging her, she must be 
subjected to it and will find no protection for her bodily integrity in our civil law.” Wagner 
v. State, 122 P.3d 599, 608 (Utah 2005) (citation omitted).
9 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 16 cmt. b, illus. 3 (AM. LAW. INST., Preliminary
Draft No. 5, 2018). 
10 Id. 
2020] Applying Oregon’s Abuse of a Vulnerable Person Statute to 329 
Date Rape Cases: Defendants Are in Treble
The dual intent rule would shield Boris from liability because he 
intended the contact but not the offense.11  
Boris’s boorish behavior is potentially insulated under Oregon law’s 
apparent consent standard. The apparent consent standard says that a 
defendant is protected if a reasonable person would have thought the 
plaintiff was consenting unless the defendant’s purpose was to harm or 
offend. Although plaintiffs like Pauline (who expressed their 
nonconsent) can argue that their lack of consent was obvious, if the 
social cues are ambiguous in the culture, then defendants like Boris can 
argue they honestly thought no meant yes. However, Boris will have a 
tough time arguing apparent consent because, under any U.S. 
community’s standards, Boris’s belief was unreasonable.12 And it is 
likely a jury would infer Boris had knowledge of Pauline’s nonconsent. 
Even under the dual intent rule, Boris is likely liable for his actions.  
In contrast, this protection for the defendant becomes meaningful 
when the victim doesn’t say no but acquiesces. Consider the following 
illustration: 
Six months after her traumatic encounter with Boris, Pauline decides 
to reenter the dating scene. Pauline’s first date, Oblivious Octavia, 
suddenly kisses Pauline fervently. Pauline, who does not consent, is 
frozen in shock to find herself in this situation again. Because of her 
shock and trauma, Pauline is unable to physically stop Octavia or tell 
her to stop. Octavia, focused on her own pleasure, continues kissing 
Pauline despite Pauline’s complete lack of enthusiasm or expression. 
Octavia believes Pauline consents. 
11 Id. These critiques have been ably rebutted by Dobbs, who argues that (1) the dual 
intent rule is preferable because without the intent to harm or offend the defendant has no 
tortious intention, and (2) the oblivious or delusional defendant issue can be corrected with 
an objective intent standard. DOBBS, supra note 5, § 35. Under an objective intent standard, 
Dobbs argues, an oblivious or delusional defendant is unlikely to convince a fact finder that 
his unconsented touchings were consensual, whatever he subjectively believed. Id. The 
Restatement (Third) of Torts calls this approach the “apparent consent” standard. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 16 cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 
2018). Here, Boris is liable if his belief—that Pauline’s lack of consent wasn’t substantially 
certain—was unreasonable based upon the facts he knew. See id. Based upon Pauline’s 
verbal protests, which Boris heard and ignored, a reasonable person would have been 
substantially certain that Pauline did not consent. Accordingly, the apparent consent 
standard holds defendants like Boris liable. 
12 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 16 cmt. g (AM. LAW. INST., Preliminary Draft 
No. 5, 2018) (“No means no” standard, that a clear refusal to consent negates any apparent 
consent, and an actor who nevertheless proceeds is subject to liability, is clearly in line with 
current social norms.).  
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Under the common law for battery, Pauline must show that Octavia 
knew it was substantially certain that Pauline did not consent to her 
kissing;13 neither recklessness nor negligence will suffice.14 The fact 
finder will infer Octavia’s knowledge of whether Pauline consented 
based on objective facts like Octavia’s relationship with Pauline, the 
nature of the contact, and the standards in the relevant community.15  
Octavia will be able to argue, perhaps more convincingly than Boris, 
that the standards of the relevant community suggest Pauline 
consented. According to the Restatement (Third) of Torts’ latest draft 
rule, very few community standards related to consent are widely 
recognized.16 Those propositions that are widely recognized but do not 
really illuminate the Octavia-Pauline scenario include:  
• “a clear refusal to consent negates any apparent consent, and an
actor who nevertheless proceeds is subject to liability”;
• “[a]ctual consent to a modest degree of sexual intimacy, such as
a kiss, does not entail consent to a much greater degree of
intimacy, such as sexual intercourse”;
• “[n]either verbal nor physical resistance is required to
demonstrate the absence of actual or apparent consent”;
• “[c]onsent may be revoked at any time before or during the
sexual act [but] may be overridden by subsequent consent[,]
[and] if [the] plaintiff expresses . . . his or her objection to any
sexual act, the actor must not proceed.”17
Unlike Boris, who proceeded with his kissing in the face of Pauline’s 
clear refusal to consent, Octavia did not violate any of the widely 
recognized community standards.18 Accordingly, Octavia is less likely 
than Boris to be held liable. Pauline truly did not consent, and she was 
silent because she was unable to verbally express her nonconsent.19 
13 See OR. UNIF. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 40.06. 
14 See Denton v. Arnstein, 197 Or. 28, 47–48, 250 P.2d 407, 416 (1952) (holding 
negligence is an insufficient intent for tortious battery); Hunter v. Farmers Ins. of Or., 
135 Or. App. 125, 137–38, 898 P.2d 201, 208 (1995) (holding recklessness is an insufficient 
intent for tort battery). 
15 Johnson v. Jones, 269 Or. App. 12, 18–19, 344 P.3d 89, 93 (2015). 
16 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 16 cmt. g (AM. LAW. INST., Preliminary Draft 
No. 5, 2018). 
17 Id. 
18 See id. (“Only yes means yes” standard, that affirmative consent—a clear willingness 
to engage in sexual conduct—is always required, is not clearly the current social norm, and 
an actor who nevertheless proceeds may or may not be subject to liability.). 
19 For empirical support for the concept that Pauline’s silence could have resulted from 
an inability to express her nonconsent rather than a choice not to, see generally Bessel Van 
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Nonetheless, Octavia thought Pauline consented because Octavia was 
oblivious. In a case where the victim stays silent, the community 
standards are particularly relevant to determining consent but may vary 
within the same community.20 Moreover, body language, such as being 
frozen, supplies relevant facts too. If a reasonable person in the 
community would know with substantial certainty that Pauline did not 
consent based on her body language, a jury can infer that Octavia knew 
as well.21 But a jury may or may not make that inference.  
Furthermore, Pauline’s claim isn’t likely any stronger because her 
silence was the product of prior trauma. Even though the incident with 
Boris left her paralyzed and unable to ward off Octavia’s kissing or to 
express her nonconsent, Octavia can act on the reasonable appearance 
of capacity just like she could act on the reasonable appearance of 
consent.22 Octavia had no reason to know about Pauline’s incapacity. 
Therefore, she would not have been substantially certain that Pauline 
was incapable of consenting.23  
In another date rape fact pattern, the victim’s intoxication—rather 
than the victim’s prior trauma—causes incapacity. Although the 
plaintiff’s intoxication is more plausibly apparent to the offender than 
prior trauma, the defendant may still be protected from liability. 
Imagine this hypothetical first date between Andy and Delusional 
Dudley:  
Andy takes the occasion of his first date with Delusional Dudley to 
become overly intoxicated. It’s a free country, and he is of age. 
Having repeatedly “shotgunned” beers for the first half hour of their 
date (and for an hour and a half beforehand), Andy finds himself in a 
drunken stupor. Andy, dehydrated, looks uncomfortable and covers 
his eyes from the sun. Dudley, wanting to appear empathetic to his 
date, asks Andy what is bothering him. Andy says, “This sun is 
killing me,” while pointing skyward. Dudley directs Andy to the 
shade of a nearby tree. Andy puts his arm around Dudley for support, 
which Dudley interprets as a blossoming romance. When the pair 
reach the tree, Andy collapses in the shade for a rest. Dudley lays 
down next to him and proceeds to suddenly and fervently kiss Andy. 
Der Kolk, THE BODY KEEPS THE SCORE: BRAIN, MIND, AND BODY IN THE HEALING OF 
TRAUMA chs. 4–5 (2014). 
20 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 16 cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST., Preliminary 
Draft No. 5, 2018). Indeed, even focusing on a community as myopic in scope as 
“American college campuses” yields ambiguous and contentious results. See sources cited 
supra note 1. 
21 See Jones, 269 Or. App. at 18, 344 P.3d at 93; see also DOBBS, supra note 5, § 106. 
22 See DOBBS, supra note 5, § 109. 
23 See Jones, 269 Or. App. at 18, 344 P.3d at 93. 
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Andy does not consent, but he is too intoxicated to communicate it. 
Dudley continues his kissing despite Andy’s utter lack of 
participation, but Dudley believes that Andy consents and has the 
capacity to consent. 
Here, the defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s incapacity is more 
plausible than it was with the trauma fact pattern, but that conclusion 
is not ironclad. Although Dudley was aware that Andy had just spent a 
half hour “shotgunning” beers, Dudley didn’t know about Andy’s hour 
and a half of drinking before he arrived, so he didn’t know Andy was 
that intoxicated. A jury could decide that Dudley reasonably assumed 
that the drinking he saw caused the smell of alcohol and wouldn’t be 
enough to cause incapacity. Furthermore, from Dudley’s perspective, 
helping Andy to the shade was a chivalrous and romantic gesture; 
Dudley didn’t know that Andy was dehydrated or that Andy’s arm 
around Dudley’s shoulder meant Andy needed help walking.  
The question again becomes whether a reasonable person would 
know that Andy was incapable of consenting at the time Dudley kissed 
him. If so, the jury can infer that Dudley knew too. A jury is more likely 
to find in Andy’s favor than in Pauline’s on a battery claim because 
Dudley was aware of some of Andy’s drinking, while Octavia wasn’t 
aware of Pauline’s prior trauma. Again, however, it may be difficult to 
convince a jury that Dudley knew with substantial certainty that Andy 
was incapable of consenting because of a half hour of drinking. 
B. Abuse of a Vulnerable Person 
In addition to battery, Pauline or Andy can also plead abuse of a 
vulnerable person, which could be helpful because doing so would 
avoid some of the doctrinal difficulties already discussed. Abuse of a 
vulnerable person has two elements:24 (1) incapacity and (2) abuse.25  
1. Incapacity
The types of incapacity seen in date rape cases (i.e., voluntary
intoxication or prior trauma) likely fall within the statutory definition 
24 See OR. REV. STAT. § 124.100 (2018) (creating a civil cause of action for the physical 
abuse of a vulnerable person). 
25 Id. A person is vulnerable if she is either elderly, financially incapable, incapacitated, 
or disabled. Id. § 124.100(1)(e). Incapacity is most relevant because “disability” has a 
durational element that most date rape victims will not meet, see id. § 124.100(1)(d)(A) 
(requiring that the disability “[i]s likely to continue without substantial improvement for no 
fewer than 12 months or to result in death”), and neither “elderly age” nor “financial 
incapability” are necessarily relevant in date rape cases. 
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of incapacity. An incapacitated person presently lacks the ability to 
protect and maintain his own physical health and safety because 
of “severely impaired perception or communication skills.”26 
Importantly, the person’s lack of communication cannot result from his 
conscious decision not to communicate—it must result from his 
inability to communicate his nonconsent or to make a conscious 
decision as to whether he consents.27 Our date rape survivors, Pauline 
and Andy, should fall within this definition.  
Pauline was unable to communicate her lack of consent to Octavia 
because her prior trauma left her frozen and unable to communicate at 
all. Pauline did not decide to remain silent because, for example, she 
feared how Octavia would react. Instead, she was simply unable to 
communicate her nonconsent. Because of her inability to communicate, 
Pauline was unable to protect herself from Octavia’s unwanted kissing; 
she was unable to protect her bodily integrity. In sum, she lacked the 
ability to protect her own physical health and safety because of severely 
impaired communication skills—she was incapacitated within the 
statutory definition. 
Andy was so drunk that he was unable to decide whether or not to 
consent. In other words, his perception was severely impaired. Because 
he was unable to perceive Dudley’s unwanted kisses, Andy was unable 
to decide whether or not to consent. Accordingly, Andy was unable to 
protect himself from Dudley’s unwanted kisses. Andy lacked the 
ability to protect and maintain his own physical health and safety 
because of severely impaired perception skills—he was incapacitated 
within the statutory definition. 
Even “fleeting” incapacity falls within the statutory definition of 
incapacity, so Pauline and Andy could both fall within the definition 
26 Schaefer v. Schaefer, 183 Or. App. 513, 516–17, 52 P.3d 1125, 1127–28 (2002); see 
Wyers v. Am. Med. Response Nw., Inc., 268 Or. App. 232, 235–36, 342 P.3d 129, 130–31 
(2014), aff’d, 360 Or. 211, 377 P.3d 570 (2016) (finding evidence was enough to show 
incapacity when three plaintiffs were “ill or injured, with an impaired ability to evaluate 
information, communicate decisions, and protect their physical safety” during some or all 
of the abuse); Herring v. Am. Med. Response Nw., Inc., 255 Or. App. 315, 321, 297 P.3d 9, 
13–14 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 125.005(5) (2017) (defining incapacity as “a condition in 
which a person’s ability to receive and evaluate information effectively or to communicate 
decisions is impaired to such an extent that the person presently lacks the capacity to meet 
the essential requirements for the person’s physical health or safety. ‘Meeting the essential 
requirements for physical health and safety’ means those actions necessary to provide the 
health care, food, shelter, clothing, personal hygiene and other care without which serious 
physical injury or illness is likely to occur”).  
27 Schaefer, 183 Or. App. at 518–19, 52 P.3d at 1128–29. 
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even though their incapacity was only temporary.28 For example, the 
plaintiff in Herring “was unable to see, move, or speak” during one of 
three unconsented-to sexual contacts that occurred over the course of 
fifteen minutes.29 In other words, she was incapacitated only for one-
third of the abuse. On appeal, the defendant argued that such fleeting 
incapacity was insufficient to meet the statutory definition because (1) 
the statute requires severity, (2) the statute uses the definition 
applicable in protective proceedings, and (3) the legislature had not 
intended the statute to apply to fleeting incapacity.30 The court held 
that the plaintiff was incapacitated even though her perception and 
communications skills were only temporarily and fleetingly 
impaired.31 
The defendant’s first argument failed.32 The court found that 
“severe” impairment doesn’t necessarily mean the impairment must 
endure after, or precede, the abuse.33 The court noted, “People 
completely but briefly lose consciousness in any number of 
situations.”34 According to Herring, duration is not a necessary 
component of severity.35  
The Herring defendant’s second argument also failed.36 Even 
though the vulnerable person statute borrows the definition of 
incapacity from the protective proceedings statute, the definition’s 
location within the protective proceedings statute did not create a 
durational requirement.37 The court found “that the provisions in the 
protective proceedings statute are relevant—if remote—context.”38 
But, the court continued, requiring that incapacity not be “so temporary 
that it could not endure for the time necessary to establish a protective 
order” would “be unworkable, far-fetched, and unsupported by 
anything in the statutory text.”39 Indeed, the legislature recognized that 
a protective order would be appropriate for even temporary incapacity 
28 Herring, 255 Or. App. at 319–20, 297 P.3d at 13. 
29 Id. at 318, 297 P.3d at 12. 
30 Id. at 319–21, 297 P.3d at 13. 
31 Id. at 319–20, 297 P.3d at 13. 
32 Id. at 319–21, 297 P.3d at 13 (“severely impaired perception or communication 
skills”) (emphasis added) (quoting Schaefer, 183 Or. App. at 516–17, 52 P.3d at 1125). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 319–20, 297 P.3d at 13. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 320, 297 P.3d at 13. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
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by enacting a provision for revoking a protective order once the 
incapacitation ends.40 Therefore, the statutory text expressly rejected a 
durational requirement.41 
Moreover, the court reflected that the protective order context was 
weak evidence of the legislature’s intent for the vulnerable person 
statute.42 Instead, the court looked to the vulnerable person statute itself 
for context and found contextual evidence that even fleeting incapacity 
will suffice.43 For one thing, the actionable conduct, defined by the 
vulnerable person statute’s abuse element, can almost invariably take 
place “during a ‘fleeting’ period of” incapacity.44 In this context, the 
inference that the legislature intended to require a greater duration for 
incapacity didn’t make sense to the court.45 Furthermore, the statutory 
definition of incapacity says a person who “presently lacks the capacity 
to meet the essential requirements for the person’s physical health or 
safety” is incapacitated.46 In the protective order context, presently 
could (theoretically) mean “when the proceeding is before the court.”47 
In the abuse of a vulnerable person context, however, the court found 
that “presently” must mean “while being abused” because the statute 
“focuses on an incident of abuse, not a judicial proceeding.”48 
Accordingly, no durational requirement could be found in the 
vulnerable person statute’s context. 
Finally, the defendant’s third argument—that the legislative history 
excluded temporary incapacity from the statutory definition—was 
unsupported and accordingly rejected.49 The defendant argued that 
testimony before the legislative committee discussing elder abuse and 
not incapacitated person abuse was evidence that the legislature did not 
intend for the statute to apply to temporary incapacity.50 However, both 
the legislative testimony and the statutory text mentioned vulnerability 
from old age and incapacity.51 Accordingly, the court concluded, 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 321–22, 297 P.3d at 14 (emphasis added) (quoting ORS 125.005(5) (2017)). 
47 Id.  
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 320–21, 297 P.3d at 13–14. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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neither source indicates that the statute protects only elderly persons.52 
Indeed, both elderly persons and incapacitated persons are explicitly 
protected by the statute.53 
Ultimately, the Herring court held that plaintiffs “who are only 
temporarily and fleetingly unable to protect” themselves from abuse, 
even for only part of the abuse, are still incapacitated.54 Accordingly, 
the court upheld the jury award for the plaintiff even though she was 
incapacitated during only part of the abuse.55 Accordingly, Octavia and 
Dudley will not be able to escape liability by arguing that Pauline and 
Andy were not incapacitated within the meaning of the statute because 
their incapacity was only temporary. 
Perhaps more importantly, Octavia and Dudley probably couldn’t 
escape liability by arguing that they relied on the appearance of 
capacity like they could under the common law. Unlike with the 
common law, a defendant’s awareness of a plaintiff’s incapacity may 
be irrelevant under the vulnerable person statute. This question is still 
open, but a court should find that there is no mental state requirement 
for incapacity. The vulnerable person statute’s definition of incapacity 
does not express a mental state requirement in its text.56 The statutory 
context also implies that the legislature did not intend a mental state 
requirement for incapacity. Incapacity is defined by reference to 
protective order provisions.57 Because protective orders are granted 
based upon the applicant’s condition, incapacity is defined by the 
condition of incapacity itself and not by a defendant’s mental state.58  
Even though the Herring court was not persuaded by the defendant’s 
arguments for a durational requirement based upon the definition’s 
protective order context, the court did concede that this context was 
52 Id. 
53 Id.; OR. REV. STAT. § 124.100(1)(e) (2018) (“‘Vulnerable person’ means: (A) An 
elderly person; . . . (C) An incapacitated person.”).  
54 Herring, 255 Or. App. at 321–22, 297 P.3d at 14. 
55 Id. 
56 OR. REV. STAT. § 125.005(5) (defining incapacity). 
57 Id. § 124.100. 
58 ‘Incapacitated’ means a condition in which a person’s ability to receive and evaluate 
information effectively or to communicate decisions is impaired to such an extent that 
the person presently lacks the capacity to meet the essential requirements for the 
person’s physical health or safety. ‘Meeting the essential requirements for physical 
health and safety’ means those actions necessary to provide the health care, food, 
shelter, clothing, personal hygiene and other care without which serious physical 
injury or illness is likely to occur. 
Id. § 125.005(5). 
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“relevant—if remote.”59 Accordingly, the court found it necessary to 
make its own textual argument to further support its rejection of the 
defendant’s contextual argument.60 Unlike the durational requirement 
in Herring, a mental state requirement lacks support in either the text 
or context of the statute. Unlike the court in Herring, a court should 
find the protective order context more relevant than remote in this 
instance. Indeed, even if a court were motivated to find a mental state 
requirement for incapacity, it is unclear where the court would find it 
or what it would be. Therefore, a court shouldn’t, and probably 
wouldn’t, find a mental state requirement for incapacity.  
2. Abuse
The vulnerable person statute’s abuse element raises two immediate
questions: (1) what standard applies, and (2) how does that standard 
compare to the standard for common-law battery? Both questions are 
deceptively difficult to answer because the legislature chose to define 
abuse by reference to criminal offenses, and a court confronted with 
these questions may reach a range of conclusions. The first question is 
difficult because the legislature did not specify whether it intended 
ancillary criminal statutes and criminal case law to color the definitions 
of abuse. The second question is difficult because of the inherent 
difficulty of comparing common-law tort standards to statutory 
criminal law standards, as the Oregon Supreme Court recently noted in 
State v. Gutierrez-Medina.61  
Turning first to the question of which standard applies, the 
vulnerable person statute defines abuse as “conduct . . . that would 
constitute any of the” various listed criminal offenses,62 including 
59 Herring, 255 Or. App. at 320, 297 P.3d at 13. 
60 Id. 
61 State v. Gutierrez-Medina, 365 Or. 79, 92–93, 442 P.3d 183, 190 (2019) (“The 
alignment between the criminal culpability and the classifications of civil fault is not 
seamless, in part because the former consists of specific elements while the latter involves 
a range of culpability.”). 
62 The complete list of criminal statutes referenced for defining actionable abuse follows: 
(a) Assault, under the provisions of ORS 163.160, 163.165, 163.175, and 163.185. 
(b) Menacing, under the provisions of ORS 163.190. 
(c) Recklessly endangering another person, under the provisions of ORS 163.195. 
(d) Criminal mistreatment, under the provisions of ORS 163.200 and 163.205. 
(e) Rape, under the provisions of ORS 163.355, 163.365, and 163.375. 
(f) Sodomy, under the provisions of ORS 163.385, 163.395, and 163.405. 
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sexual abuse in the third degree (hereafter, “sexual abuse”).63 The 
legislature did not explicitly indicate whether it intended to incorporate 
the applicable ancillary criminal provisions and criminal case law with 
these definitions. Accordingly, it is unclear what legal standards could 
apply to the different definitions of abuse. Looking at the definition for 
sexual abuse, the definition requires unconsented-to sexual contact just 
like common-law battery requires.64 The sexual abuse statute’s text 
doesn’t express a mental state requirement.65 However, an ancillary 
provision in the Oregon Criminal Code provides that “a person is not 
guilty of an offense unless the person acts with a culpable mental state 
with respect to each material element of the offense that necessarily 
requires a culpable mental state.”66 Oregon criminal case law 
interpreting the sexual abuse statute has clarified that the victim’s lack 
of consent is a material element of sexual abuse that necessarily 
requires a culpable mental state.67 Oregon has four culpable mental 
states: intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, and with criminal 
negligence.68 A criminal defendant would be found criminally 
negligent if he  
fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result 
will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such 
nature and degree that the failure to be aware of it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would 
observe in the situation.69  
(g) Unlawful sexual penetration, under the provisions of ORS 163.408 and 
163.411. 
(h) Sexual abuse, under the provisions of ORS 163.415, 163.425, and 163.427. 
(i) Strangulation, under ORS 163.187. 
OR. REV. STAT. § 124.105(1). 
63 Id. § 124.105(1)(h). “(1) A person commits the crime of sexual abuse in the third 
degree if: (a) The person subjects another person to sexual contact and: (A) The victim does 
not consent to the sexual contact.” Id. § 163.415 (defining sexual abuse in the third degree). 
Sexual abuse is the most applicable prong with Pauline and Andy’s cases, so the subsequent 
discussion will illustrate the statute’s application using sexual abuse. However, attorneys 
should reference the other actionable provisions to determine which prong works best with 
the unique facts of a case. 
64 Id. § 163.415 (defining sexual abuse in the third degree). 
65 See id. 
66 Id. § 161.095(2). 
67 State v. Wier, 260 Or. App. 341, 354, 317 P.3d 330, 337 (2013) (finding that sexual 
abuse “requires the state to prove that a defendant acted knowingly, recklessly, or with 
criminal negligence with respect to a victim’s lack of consent”). 
68 OR. REV. STAT. § 161.085(6). 
69 Id. § 161.085(10). 
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At the very least, then, a prosecutor must show that a criminal 
defendant failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
victim did not consent to convict the defendant of sexual abuse. The 
vulnerable person statute doesn’t say whether a civil plaintiff’s attorney 
would need to make the same showing to get a verdict for abuse of a 
vulnerable person.  
A court could very well infer that the legislature intended the same 
culpable mental state requirement to apply in cases of abuse of a 
vulnerable person as in sexual abuse prosecutions. Oregon courts 
consider essentially anything the legislature could have been aware of 
at the time of enactment as relevant context in interpreting a statute.70 
The ancillary criminal statute requiring proof of a culpable mental state 
for all criminal offenses was enacted before abuse of a vulnerable 
person,71 so the legislature could have been aware of it when enacting 
the vulnerable person statute. A court could infer from the legislature’s 
use of criminal offenses to define abuse that the legislature intended 
that the ancillary criminal statute would apply and require proof of a 
culpable mental state in cases of abuse of a vulnerable person.  
Furthermore, the vulnerable person statute defines abuse as “conduct 
. . . that would constitute any of the” listed criminal offenses.72 Another 
ancillary criminal statute defines “conduct” as “an act or omission and 
its accompanying mental state.”73 Again, this provision was enacted 
before the vulnerable person statute,74 so the legislature could have 
been aware of it when it enacted the vulnerable person statute. The 
vulnerable person statute’s use of the word “conduct,” then, could 
imply that the legislature intended to require proof of both the act or 
omission and its accompanying mental state for the abuse.  
However, there is yet another ancillary criminal statute worth 
considering: ORS 163.315, which was enacted before the vulnerable 
70 Holcomb v. Sunderland, 321 Or. 99, 105, 894 P.2d 457, 460 (1995); see also State v. 
Gaines, 346 Or. 160, 177 n.16, 206 P.3d 1042, 1054 n.16 (2009); and Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or. 
72, 79–80, 326 P.2d 722, 725–26 (1997). 
71 Compare Act of Feb. 13, 1971, ch. 743, § 7, 1971 Or. Laws 32 (codified at ORS 
161.085(10)), with Act of May 30, 1995, ch. 671, § 2, 1995 Or. Laws 2–3 (codified as 
amended at ORS 124.105). 
72 Id. § 124.105(1) (emphasis added). 
73 Id. § 161.085(4). 
74 Compare Act of Feb. 13, 1971, ch. 743, § 7, 1971 Or. Laws 32 (codified at ORS 
161.085(4)), with Act of May 30, 1995, ch. 671, § 2, 1995 Or. Laws 2–3 (codified as 
amended at ORS 124.105). 
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person statute,75 states that “[a] person is considered incapable of 
consenting to a sexual act if the person is . . . [among other conditions,] 
[p]hysically helpless.”76 According to the Oregon Criminal Code, a 
physically helpless “person is unconscious or for any other reason is 
physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act.”77 That 
definition should sound vaguely familiar because a person is 
incapacitated within the meaning of the vulnerable person statute if the 
“person’s ability to receive and evaluate information effectively or to 
communicate decisions is impaired.”78 The similarities between the 
two definitions could mean that a person who is incapacitated is often 
also physically helpless because both conditions stem from an impaired 
perception or communicative ability. The definition for incapacity 
does, however, go on to introduce a severity requirement,79 so a court 
would probably find a per se application of ORS 163.315 to date rape 
cases inappropriate. But, as long as a court is applying the ancillary 
criminal statutes to the definition of abuse in a vulnerable person claim 
and requiring the plaintiff to meet the mental state requirements, the 
court should also apply ORS 163.315 and allow the plaintiff to defeat 
the mental state requirement by using the same facts to show her 
physical helplessness as she used to show her incapacity.80 
Accordingly, in many date rape cases, the plaintiff shouldn’t have to 
prove the defendant’s mental state.81  
75 Compare Act of Feb. 13, 1971, ch. 743, § 105, 1971 Or. Laws 32 (codified at ORS 
163.315(1)), with Act of May 30, 1995, ch. 671, § 2, 1995 Or. Laws 2–3 (codified as 
amended at ORS 124.105). 
76 OR. REV. STAT. § 163.315(1) (2017). 
77 Id. § 163.305(5). 
78 Id. § 125.005(5). 
79 Id. (requiring impairment “to such an extent that the person presently lacks the 
capacity to meet the essential requirements for the person’s physical health or safety”). 
80 Cf. State v. Gutierrez-Medina, 365 Or. 79, 84, 442 P.3d 183, 185 (2019) (“Thus, even 
if we assume that the legislature intended to incorporate the civil law defense of comparative 
fault into the calculation of criminal restitution under ORS 137.106, the defense would be 
unavailable to a defendant who commits third-degree assault in the manner that defendant 
did.”). 
81 There are also good arguments that a court should decide to interpret the requirements 
of the abuse definitions de novo rather than relying on the ancillary criminal statutes and 
criminal case law. The court in Herring concluded that the prior restraint protective orders 
were “relevant—if remote—context” for the vulnerable person statute. Herring v. Am. Med. 
Response Nw., Inc., 255 Or. App. 315, 320, 297 P.3d 9, 13 (2013). More relevant, the court 
said, was the vulnerable person statute itself. Id. A court could reach a similar conclusion 
with the abuse definitions. In such a case, the sexual abuse provision’s lack of a textual 
mental state requirement could lead the court to conclude that the plaintiff does not need to 
prove the defendant’s mental state at all. The American Law Institute (ALI) contends that 
“if criminal law does classify a species of conduct as nonconsensual, it is very likely that 
2020] Applying Oregon’s Abuse of a Vulnerable Person Statute to 341 
Date Rape Cases: Defendants Are in Treble
In any case, even if the court does require proof of the defendant’s 
mental state, proving nonconsent here is potentially easier than it is for 
battery. All criminal mental states must fall into one of four categories. 
In order from least to most culpable, those categories are criminally 
negligent, reckless, knowing, and intentional.82 Likewise, all tortious 
mental states must fall into one of four categories. In order from least 
to most tortious, those categories are: simply negligent, grossly 
negligent, wanton, and intentional.83 For sexual abuse, the plaintiff 
needs to show only that the defendant negligently caused an 
unconsented contact with her.84 In other words, to hold the defendant 
liable for abuse of a vulnerable person, the plaintiff must meet the 
lowest mental state requirement to impose criminal liability. For 
battery, the plaintiff must show the defendant intentionally meant to 
harm or offend her.85 In other words, to hold a defendant liable for 
battery, a plaintiff must meet the highest mental state requirement for 
tort liability. However, the comparison is not one-to-one because 
criminal mental states are made up of specific elements while tortious 
tort law should treat that conduct as nonconsensual as well.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS § 16 cmt. g (AM. LAW. INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2018). The ALI’s theory is 
that criminal liability is much more severe than tort liability, so criminal liability should be 
more cautious. Id. Both the statute’s text and public policy could allow a court to justifiably 
conclude that a lesser showing is required for tort liability under the vulnerable person 
statute than for is required for criminal liability under the sexual abuse statute. Although 
some may argue that this interpretation would lead to an absurd result (namely, strict liability 
for a sexual abuse victim’s lack of consent), the ALI also recognizes that community 
standards related to consent have been changing over the past fifty years to become much 
more protective of victims. Id. Accordingly, a more victim-protective interpretation of the 
vulnerable person statute may not be absurd at all. Indeed, it may simply track changing 
community standards related to consent. 
82 OR. REV. STAT. § 161.085(6)–(10) (2017). 
83 Cook v. Kinzua Pine Mills Co., 207 Or. 34, 58–59, 293 P.2d 717. 
84 Compare OR. REV. STAT. § 124.105(1)(h) (2018) (stating “conduct against a 
vulnerable person that would constitute” sexual abuse in the third degree meets the abuse 
element of abuse of a vulnerable person), and OR. REV. STAT. § 163.415(1)(a) (stating 
sexual contact and nonconsent are the elements of sexual abuse in the third degree), with 
State v. Wier, 260 Or. App. 341, 354, 317 P.3d 330, 337 (2013) (stating sexual abuse in the 
third degree “requires the state to prove that a defendant acted knowingly, recklessly, or 
with criminal negligence with respect to a victim’s lack of consent”). See Wier, 260 Or. App. 
at 354, 317 P.3d at 337; accord OR. REV. STAT. § 161.085(10) (“‘Criminal negligence’ or 
‘criminally negligent,’ when used with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by 
a statute defining an offense, means that a person fails to be aware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be 
of such nature and degree that the failure to be aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from 
the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.”). 
85 OR. UNIF. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 40.06. 
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mental states encompass a range of culpability.86 The Oregon Supreme 
Court recently created a three-step analytical framework comparing 
criminal and tortious mental state requirements based on the (1) nature 
of the risk, (2) degree of the risk, and (3) degree of awareness with 
which the person acts in the face of that risk.87  
First, the nature of the risk for both claims is the same—in both cases 
the defendant risks that the plaintiff did not consent to the sexual 
contact.88 Second, the degree of the risk is lower for abuse than for 
battery. For abuse, the plaintiff must show that there was a “substantial 
and unjustifiable risk.”89 For battery, the plaintiff must show that the 
defendant was “substantially certain” of the risk.90 In case there is still 
any confusion that the nature and degree of risk required for battery is 
higher than the “substantial and unjustifiable risk” required for abuse, 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that “[a]s the probability that 
the consequences will follow decreases, and becomes less than 
substantial certainty, the actor’s conduct loses the character of intent, 
and becomes mere recklessness . . . [a]s the probability decreases 
further, and amounts only to a risk that the result will follow, it becomes 
ordinary negligence.”91  
Third, the degree of awareness is also lower for abuse than for 
battery. For abuse, the plaintiff must show the defendant unreasonably 
failed to be aware of the risk that she did not consent.92 For battery, the 
86 State v. Gutierrez-Medina, 365 Or. 79, 92–93, 442 P.3d 183, 190 (2019). 
87 Id. 
88 Compare OR. REV. STAT. § 161.085(10), with OR. UNIF. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
§ 40.06.
89 See sources cited supra note 84. 
90 OR. UNIF. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 40.06(2). Somewhat incongruously, the 
criminal negligence standard of abuse further requires that “[t]he risk must be of such nature 
and degree that the failure to be aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard 
of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 161.085(10).
91 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 1965) (emphasis 
added). 
92 OR. REV. STAT. § 161.085(10). The failure to be aware must constitute a gross 
departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe based on the 
nature and degree of the risk. Id. The standard, according to the statute’s text, is met by the 
weight of the nature and degree of the risk, not the awareness itself. Here, the nature and 
degree of the risk is a substantial and unjustifiable risk of sexual assault. A defendant 
probably would not escape liability by arguing that her failure to perceive a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that she was committing sexual assault was not a gross departure from the 
standard of care that a reasonable person would observe. In any case, it is possible that a 
defendant could make the argument, but I find the argument too unlikely to succeed to 
address more substantively. 
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plaintiff must show that the defendant desired for or knew of the risk 
that she did not consent.93 Furthermore, the defendant can escape 
liability for battery if she can show that she reasonably relied on the 
plaintiff’s apparent consent. Of course, even if the defendant claims she 
relied on apparent consent, the jury can infer that the defendant did 
know that the plaintiff did not consent if a reasonable person in the 
relevant community would have known it with substantial certainty.94 
Applying those standards to the “Oblivious Octavia” hypothetical 
from the previous Section, Pauline is more likely to prevail against 
Oblivious Octavia under the abuse standard than under the battery 
standard. Pauline, because of her prior trauma, did not communicate 
her lack of consent to Octavia. Therefore, Octavia may be protected by 
apparent consent when sued for battery because Octavia can plausibly 
show that she did not know of the substantial certainty that Pauline did 
not consent. Contrastingly, under the abuse standard, Pauline need only 
prove that Octavia should have known of a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that Pauline did not consent. Pauline may meet that standard 
because she was frozen and completely unenthusiastic; Octavia’s 
continued kissing was probably unreasonable without an affirmative 
manifestation of Pauline’s consent because Pauline’s body language 
probably indicated there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
Pauline did not consent. Octavia’s obliviousness does not help her 
because the vulnerable person claim makes Octavia liable for her 
unreasonable failure to perceive Pauline’s nonconsent.  
In sum, incapacity and abuse make up the substance of an abuse of 
a vulnerable person claim. As explored, the vulnerable person statute 
may provide plaintiffs with substantive advantages compared to the 
common law.  
Other provisions of the vulnerable person statute provide distinct 
advantages to plaintiffs too. For example, the statute procedurally 
advantages vulnerable plaintiffs with a seven-year statute of limitations 
for abuse of a vulnerable person claims,95 which is obviously much 
more pro-plaintiff than the two-year statute of limitations for battery.96 
The vulnerable person statute also provides plaintiffs with remedial 
93 OR. UNIF. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 40.06. 
94 See Johnson v. Jones, 269 Or. App. 12, 18, 344 P.3d 89, 93 (2015); see also DOBBS, 
supra note 5, § 106. 
95 OR. REV. STAT. § 124.130 (defining abuse of a vulnerable person statute of 
limitations). 
96 See id. § 12.110(1) (defining battery statute of limitations). 
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advantages through the damages provision97 and the third-party 
liability provision.98 These two provisions and the remedial advantages 
they provide are explored in the next two Sections.  
3. The Damages Provision
Oregon law severely limits civil damages awards, so the treble
damages provision in the vulnerable person statute is especially useful. 
Ordinarily, noneconomic damage awards cannot exceed $500,000.99 
Furthermore, because Oregon follows the American rule, attorney fees 
are not a component of a damages award.100 In contrast, the damages 
provision of the vulnerable person statute requires courts to triple the 
sum of any judgment for nonpunitive damages and to award reasonable 
attorney fees.101 Further, the court must award reasonable attorney 
fees.102 
Oregon law also has special statutory rules on punitive damages, but 
the vulnerable person statute may get around them.103 Oregon law 
requires that the plaintiff must state her intent to seek punitive damages 
in her original complaint. Otherwise, she must subsequently file a 
motion to amend her complaint to seek them.104 The plaintiff must 
meet a higher evidentiary standard (“clear and convincing evidence”) 
and establish a higher level of culpability (“malice” or “reckless and 
outrageous indifference to a highly unreasonable risk of harm”).105 If 
awarded, the punitive damages are subject to judicial review for 
excessiveness.106 Furthermore, only 30% of the award goes to the 
plaintiff and her attorney; the other 70% goes to the Attorney 
General.107 
97 Id. § 124.100(2). 
98 Id. § 124.100(5). 
99 Id. § 31.710(1). Although ORS 31.710 purports to limit noneconomic damages 
claims, a trio of recent cases bring the statute’s constitutionality into question. Rains v. 
Stayton Builders Mart, Inc., 289 Or. App. 672, 691, 410 P.3d 336, 347 (2018); Busch v. 
McInnis Waste Syst., 292 Or. App. 820, 824, 426 P.3d 235, 237–38 (2018); Vasquez v. 
Double Press Mfg., 288 Or. App. 503, 525–26, 406 P.3d 225, 237 (2017). 
100 Deras v. Myers, 272 Or. 47, 65, 535 P.2d 541, 550 (1975) (en banc). 
101 OR. REV. STAT. § 124.100(2). 
102 Id. § 124.100(2)(c). 
103 Id. § 31.725. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. § 31.730(1). 
106 Id. § 31.730(2). 
107 Id. § 31.735(1). Sixty percent of the Attorney General’s portion is “for deposit in the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Account of the Department of Justice Crime Victims’ 
Assistance Section” (or, if the prevailing party is a public entity, the general fund of the 
2020] Applying Oregon’s Abuse of a Vulnerable Person Statute to 345 
Date Rape Cases: Defendants Are in Treble
The treble damage award mandated by Oregon’s vulnerable person 
statute, on the other hand, has no such limits or heightened standards 
because it is not punitive in nature.108 The Herring plaintiff won 
$500,000 in noneconomic damages in a jury trial.109 The trial court 
then entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $1,500,000 (the 
trebled award) and awarded the plaintiff $600,000 in attorney fees.110 
The appellate court rejected the defendant’s argument that the 
enhanced award violated the statutory noneconomic damages cap, the 
heightened punitive damages requirements, and the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.111  
First, the court rejected the application of the statutory damages cap 
to the trebled award.112 The court reasoned that the trebled portion of 
the damages was not itself an award of economic or noneconomic 
damages, but was rather “more in the nature of a fine” than 
compensation for “subjective, nonmonetary losses.”113 
Next, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the trebled 
portion was functionally equivalent to punitive damages that “trigger[] 
the procedural and substantive protections that are provided when 
punitive damages are awarded.”114 The court found no mental state 
requirement in the text of the damages provision. Accordingly, the 
court refused to insert the higher culpability requirement for punitive 
damages because the legislature omitted such a requirement.115 
Furthermore, the court found no reason that the legislature would have 
intended the trebled award to apply in only particularly egregious 
abuses of a vulnerable person.116 Instead, the court reasoned that the 
legislature “properly concluded that violations [of the statute] were per 
se sufficiently egregious to justify the enhanced award.”117 Indeed, the 
legislature enacted the treble damages provision, in part, to remedy the 
public entity); id. § 31.735(1)(b); and 10% of the Attorney General’s portion is “for deposit 
in the State Court Facilities and Security Account”; id. § 31.735(1)(c). 
108 Herring v. Am. Med. Response Nw., Inc., 255 Or. App. 315, 326–27, 297 P.3d 9, 
16–17 (2013). 
109 Id. at 317, 297 P.3d at 11–12. 
110 Id. at 317, 297 P.3d at 12. 
111 Id. at 322–24, 297 P.3d at 14–15. 
112 Id. at 323, 297 P.3d at 14–15. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 324, 297 P.3d at 15. 
115 Id. at 325, 297 P.3d at 16; accord OR. REV. STAT. § 174.010 (2017). 
116 Herring, 255 Or. App. at 325, 297 P.3d at 16. 
117 Id. 
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failings of punitive damages in Oregon.118 The threat of punitive 
damages did not encourage pretrial settlement.119 Punitive damages are 
not assured whereas the statutory trebling is mandatory, if the plaintiff 
prevails.120 Punitive damages were also insufficient because juries 
erroneously awarded them to compensate plaintiffs without realizing 
that the plaintiff would receive only 30% of those damages.121  
Finally, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the trebled 
award must be reviewed for excessiveness under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.122  
Just like the jury did in Herring, a jury could award Pauline and 
Andy each up to $500,000 in noneconomic damages—assuming the 
evidence supported it. The statute would then require the trial court to 
enter an award for up to $1,500,000 in each case.123 Unlike an award 
of punitive damages, their awards would not be subject to review for 
excessiveness under the Due Process Clause.124 The court would also 
have to award reasonable attorney’s fees.125 With the combination of 
the treble damages and attorney fees provisions, Pauline and Andy 
would get to keep 100% of their award for themselves.  
118 Hearings on H.B. 2449 Before the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 72d Or. Legis. Assemb. 
(Mar. 25, 2003), audio recording at 15:40 [hereinafter H. Hearings on H.B. 2449] (testimony 
of Virginia Mitchell, attorney who represents seniors); Hearings on H.B. 2449 Before the S. 
Comm. on Judiciary, 72d Or. Legis. Assemb. (May 12, 2003), audio recording at 10:30 
[hereinafter S. Hearings on H.B. 2449] (comments of Senator Charles Ringo, one of the 
bill’s sponsors). All legislative materials cited in this Comment are located in the Oregon 
State Archives, Salem, Oregon. 
119 H. Hearings on H.B. 2449, supra note 118; S. Hearings on H.B. 2449, supra note 
118. 
120 H. Hearings on H.B. 2449, supra note 118; S. Hearings on H.B. 2449, supra note 
118. 
121 H. Hearings on H.B. 2449, supra note 118; S. Hearings on H.B. 2449, supra note 
118. 
122 Analyzing the facts of the case under the “three guideposts” used to determine the 
validity of punitive damages awards (“the reprehensibility of the conduct, the disparity 
between the harm and the punitive award, and the difference between the punitive award 
and ‘civil penalties’ imposed in comparable cases”), the court concluded that, even if the 
trebled award were punitive, the award did not meet these elements. Herring, 255 Or. App. 
at 326, 297 P.3d at 16. 
123 See OR. REV. STAT. § 124.100(2)(a)–(b) (2017); Herring, 255 Or. App. at 322–24, 
297 P.3d at 14–15. 
124 Herring, 255 Or. App. at 322–24, 297 P.3d at 14–15. 
125 See OR. REV. STAT. § 124.100(2)(c). 
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4. The Third-Party Liability Provision
The vulnerable person statute includes a theory of direct third-party
liability against those who permit the abuse of a vulnerable person to 
occur.126 The Oregon Supreme Court analyzed this provision and its 
requirements extensively in Wyers.127  
Wyers was a consolidated appeal.128 The six plaintiffs were suing an 
ambulance company for permitting its employee-paramedic to sexually 
abuse them during their transport by ambulance to a hospital.129 The 
ambulance company did not actually know of any prior abuse until 
pretrial discovery for the Herring case.130 The trial court granted 
summary judgment because the defendant didn’t know of its 
employee’s acts of abuse when the defendant’s indirect acts permitted 
its employee to abuse the plaintiffs.131 The Oregon Court of Appeals 
reversed summary judgment,132 and the Oregon Supreme Court 
affirmed the court of appeals’ decision.133 
Two aspects of the supreme court’s analysis in Wyers are worth 
exploring in detail, namely, the court’s analysis of whether a business 
can be liable for permission and what mental state requirements are 
necessary to show permission. The first interesting aspect of the court’s 
analysis addresses the question of who can be liable for permitting the 
abuse. In short, the court held that any individual or institution other 
than those specifically exempted by the vulnerable person statute could 
potentially be liable for permitting the abuse of a vulnerable person.134 
The defendant in Wyers argued that employers and other institutions 
could not be liable for permission.135 The court held that businesses 
126 Id. § 124.100(5); Am. Med. Response Nw., Inc. v. Ace Am. Ins., 526 Fed. App’x 
754 (9th Cir. 2013) (unpublished table decision) (reversing the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of insurer in declaratory action for insurance coverage for 
permitting abuse of a vulnerable person when the insurance policy had an intentional-acts 
exclusion). 
127 Wyers v. Am. Med. Response Nw., Inc., 360 Or. 211, 227–28, 377 P.3d 570, 
579–80 (2016). 
128 Id. at 214, 377 P.3d at 572.  
129 Id.  
130 Id. at 215, 377 P.3d at 573.  
131 Id. at 214, 377 P.3d at 572.  
132 Wyers v. Am. Med. Response Nw., Inc., 268 Or. App. 232, 255, 342 P.3d 129, 141 
(2014), aff’d, 360 Or. 211, 377 P.3d 570 (2016). 
133 Wyers, 360 Or. at 214, 377 P.3d at 572. 
134 Id. at 228–29, 377 P.3d at 580. 
135 Id. at 230, 377 P.3d at 581. 
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like the defendant are, indeed, potentially liable for permission.136 In 
reaching this holding, the court noted that the vulnerable person statute 
enumerates specific entities not subject to action, and businesses are 
not included among them.137  
Drawing upon the legislative history, the Wyers court explained that 
the bill’s drafter drafted it to provide a specific remedy for the abuse of 
elders and incapacitated people to protect those vulnerable 
populations.138 The drafter explained that she was focused on 
individual abusers and entities with fewer regulations rather than 
nursing homes, which, she said, “[were] already . . . heavily 
regulated.”139 Amendments were introduced to exempt these certain 
“heavily regulated” entities, and the amended bill passed 
unanimously.140 Accordingly, the vulnerable person statute exempts 
certain specified entities from liability.141 Consistent with the rule of 
expressio unius and the legislative history for the vulnerable person 
statute, the Wyers court held that unless legally exempted from 
liability,142 employers and other institutions can be liable for 
permitting abuse.143 In other words, the permission provision doesn’t 
require a special relationship to impose liability; the relationship 
between the third-party and abuser is immaterial as long as the other 
elements are met and the defendant isn’t explicitly exempted from 
liability by the statute.144 
The second interesting aspect of the court’s analysis addressed the 
mental states requirements. The court concluded that ORS 124.100(5) 
applied when a defendant knowingly acts or fails to act “under 
136 Id. 
137 OR. REV. STAT. § 124.115(1) (an action may not be brought against financial 
institutions, health care facilities, facilities licensed under ORS chapter 443,—i.e., nursing, 
residential care, and assisted living facilities—or broker-dealers.). 
138 Wyers, 360 Or. at 228, 377 P.3d at 580; Hearings on S.B. 943 Before the S. Comm. 
on Judiciary, 68th Or. Legis. Assemb. (Mar. 23, 1995), exhibits at R (statement of Bertalan); 
see also Hearings on S.B. 943 Before the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 68th Or. Legis. Assemb. 
(May 12, 1995), exhibits at D (statement of Bertalan). 
139 Wyers, 360 Or. at 228, 377 P.3d at 580; Hearings on S.B. 943 Before the S. Comm. 
on Judiciary, 68th Or. Legis. Assemb. (Apr. 12, 1995), tape 102, side B (statement of 
Bertalan). 
140 Wyers, 360 Or. at 228, 377 P.3d at 580. 
141 OR. REV. STAT. § 124.115 (enumerating “persons not subject to action”).  
142 Nursing, residential care, assisted living, and healthcare facilities are exempted from 
civil liability unless criminally convicted of the underlying sexual abuse. OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 124.115.
143 Wyers, 360 Or. at 228, 377 P.3d at 580 (citing Crimson Trace Corp. v. Davis Wright 
Tremaine LLP, 355 Or. 476, 497, 326 P.3d 1181, 1193 (2014) for expressio unius rule). 
144 Id. at 227–28, 377 P.3d at 580. 
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circumstances in which a reasonable person should have known that 
the same sort of abuse of a vulnerable person that occurred would, in 
fact, occur,” and that defendant is liable for permitting that abuse.145 
According to Wyers, then, a defendant can be liable for permission 
without having knowledge (actual or constructive) of the particular 
plaintiff or the particular abuse.146 Rather, the court concluded, the 
permission provision applies when the defendant should have known, 
“in light of information known or available to a reasonable person,” of 
the kind of abuse that the plaintiff suffered.147 
In reaching these conclusions, the court grappled with what it 
described as “awkwardly phrased” mental state requirements in the text 
of the permission provision.148 To help unpack the Wyers 
interpretation, let us first consider the provision itself with annotated 
information from Wyers: 
An action may be brought under this section against a person for 
permitting another person to engage in physical or financial abuse 
[(result)] if the person knowingly [(actual knowledge)] acts or fails to 
act [(conduct)] under circumstances in which a reasonable person 
should have known [(constructive knowledge)] of the physical or 
financial abuse [(circumstances)].149 
According to the Wyers court, mental state requirements (like the two 
emphasized in italics above) always refer to another element in the 
statute—either result, conduct, or circumstances.150 Further, the court 
stated that statutes must be construed to give each of its elements effect, 
if possible.151 The two mental state requirements in the permission 
provision would be impossible to reconcile if they both refer to the 
same element because one mental state requires actual knowledge and 
the other requires only constructive knowledge.152 Accordingly, the 
145 Id. at 230, 377 P.3d at 581. 
146 Id. at 230, 377 P.3d at 580–81. 
147 Id. at 229, 377 P.3d at 581. 
148 Id. at 221, 377 P.3d at 576. 
149 OR. REV. STAT. § 124.100(5) (2017) (emphasis added) (annotations glossed from the 
Oregon Supreme Court’s analysis in Wyers, 360 Or. at 227–28, 377 P.3d at 580). 
150 Wyers, 360 Or. at 221, 377 P.3d at 576 (citing State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160, 171–72, 
206 P.3d 1042 (2009)). 
151 Id. (citing Force v. Dep’t of Rev., 350 Or. 179, 190, 252 P.3d 306 (2011); see also 
OR. REV. STAT. § 174.010 (“[W]here there are several provisions or particulars such 
construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.”). 
152 See Wyers, 360 Or. at 221, 377 P.3d at 576 (“It is an awkwardly phrased bit of 
drafting, to say the least. And the parties’ difficulty in reconciling the two is 
understandable.”). 
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court observed, one of the provision’s elements must require actual 
knowledge, and another element must require constructive 
knowledge.153  
Wyers held that the actual knowledge requirement refers to the 
conduct (i.e., acting or failing to act), and the constructive knowledge 
refers to the circumstances (i.e., physical or financial abuse).154 
Furthermore, the result element—permitting “another person to engage 
in physical . . . abuse”—has no mental state requirement.155 The court 
held permitting, as used here, is defined as “making something [(i.e., 
physical abuse)] possible,” regardless of whether the actor intended to 
make the abuse possible.156  
The court illustrated its holding with an example of an employer who 
“knowingly (as opposed to, say, inadvertently) schedules an employee 
to work on an ambulance run under circumstances in which a 
reasonable person should have known that the sort of abuse inflicted 
on the plaintiff would occur.”157 Thus, permitting date rape within the 
meaning of the statute means (1) knowingly (“as opposed to, say, 
inadvertently”) acting or failing to act (conduct), (2) when a reasonable 
person should have known sexual abuse would occur (circumstances), 
and (3) date rape occurs (result).158 The Wyers court left an open 
question—whether a defendant could also be liable under ORS 
124.100(5) “under circumstances in which a reasonable person should 
have known that such abuse as did occur was merely foreseeable.”159 
The court didn’t reach this question of interpretation because the 
153 See id. 
154 Id. at 231, 377 P.3d at 581–82. 
155 Id. at 231, 377 P.3d at 578. 
156 Id. at 222, 377 P.3d at 577. 
157 Id. at 230, 377 P.3d at 581. 
158 See id. The underlying abuse is an element of the permission cause of action. 
Although an individual defendant who was criminally convicted of the underlying abuse 
would be precluded from denying the conduct, OR. REV. STAT. § 124.140 (2017), a 
defendant being sued for permission can likely deny the underlying abuse occurred and 
require the plaintiff to prove it, Nelson v. Emerald People’s Util. Dist., 318 Or. 99, 104, 862 
P.2d 1293, 1296–97 (1993) (holding issue preclusion requires (1) “[t]he issue in the two 
proceedings is identical.” (2) “The issue was actually litigated and was essential to a final 
decision on the merits in the prior proceeding.” (3) “The party sought to be precluded has 
had a full and fair opportunity to be heard on that issue.” (4) “The party sought to be 
precluded was a party or was in privity with a party to the prior proceeding.” (5) “The prior 
proceeding was the type of proceeding to which [the] court will give preclusive effect.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
159 Wyers, 360 Or. at 230 n.5, 377 P.3d at 581. 
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evidence in the record permitted a reasonable juror to find the 
defendant liable under the court’s “would, in fact, occur” standard.160 
a. Hypothetical Illustration
To help digest the Wyers holding, imagine the following
hypothetical: 
Common-Law Bob owns and runs a local bar where young people 
like to drink and dance to country music on a Friday night. After 
thirty years in the bar business, he realized that talking to customers 
with complaints was a waste of time because, ultimately, the 
complainers just wanted to vent their frustrations. Accordingly, he 
set up a voice mailbox for all customer complaints that he never 
checked. The voice mailbox would give customers with complaints 
their cathartic release, and he wouldn’t have to listen to it. Everybody 
wins, he thought. Six months ago, Bob hired his niece, Bethany, as a 
bouncer (after she had been fired from several other jobs for sexual 
harassment). After hiring her, Bob checked in with his other 
employees regularly to make sure her sexually harassing behavior 
didn’t continue with his employees. There was no sign of trouble 
until one busy Friday night when Victor, a patron, got overly 
intoxicated at the bar. After last call, Victor was in no state to drive. 
He was in no state to hail an Uber either. Bethany clocked out for the 
night, and, on her way out the front door, she picked up Victor and 
placed him on her motorcycle, which was parked in front of the bar. 
When they arrived at Bethany’s house, she began kissing Victor 
fervently, which he did not consciously perceive because of his 
intoxication. As it turns out, Bob’s customer complaint voice 
mailbox had five unheard voicemails from different callers claiming 
Bethany had sexually assaulted the caller while she was working at 
the bar. 
If Common-Law Bob’s knowing act or omission made the date rape 
possible, and Bob should have known abuse of the same type would 
occur, then Bob is liable for permission.161 
The conduct element (i.e., “acts or fails to act”) sets a low threshold 
in the employer liability context. Relevant conduct could be as simple 
as scheduling or hiring an employee who commits the underlying abuse 
on the job.162 Presumably, Bob knowingly (rather than, say, 
inadvertently) scheduled Bethany on the night she abused Victor. This 
same conduct was enough to meet the conduct element in Wyers.163 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 228–30, 377 P.3d at 580–81. 
162 Id. at 229–30, 377 P.3d at 581. 
163 Id. (“[Defendant-employer] does not suggest that it had not knowingly assigned 
[defendant-employee] to work as a paramedic during each of the six alleged incidents of 
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The key, from Wyers, is that the employer knows what he is doing; he 
does not need to know, however, that what he is doing will permit 
abuse.164  
Consequently, permission claims for failure to act are the least likely 
to meet the actual knowledge requirement. Although a third party could 
knowingly fail to act or unknowingly act, each of those situations is 
less likely than its inverse. Seemingly, then, the actual knowledge 
requirement would most often limit permission liability when the third 
party unknowingly fails to act. When the third party acts affirmatively, 
though, she likely does so knowingly. Accordingly, satisfaction of the 
conduct element is least likely when a third party’s failure to act 
permits the abuse of a vulnerable person. For example, a permission 
claim for a third party’s failure to properly supervise her employee 
would likely fail unless the employer actually knew she was not 
supervising her employee. As for Common-Law Bob, he thought he 
was supervising Bethany properly, but he was wrong; still, he did not 
have actual knowledge of his failure to act, so he probably would not 
be liable for permission for this conduct.  
Claims for affirmative conduct beyond those discussed could 
probably meet the actual knowledge requirement in most cases. For 
example, the conduct element might also be met by knowingly 
adopting policies. Even if Bob inadvertently scheduled Bethany on the 
night she assaulted Victor, Bob knowingly funneled customer 
complaints to a voice mailbox that he did not check. This policy could 
probably be used to meet the conduct element of a permission claim 
against Bob.  
The result element (i.e., the abuse) requires the plaintiff to show that 
the employer’s scheduling, or other knowing conduct, made it possible 
for the employee to sexually assault her. Accordingly, this element 
could be met if the abuse occurs during the time an employee was 
scheduled,165 on the employer’s premises,166 in the employer’s 
vehicle,167 or is otherwise made possible by the employer’s conduct.168 
Note, however, that permission liability is not limited to abuse that 
abuse. That means, then, that a genuine issue of material fact exists about whether 
[defendant-employer] did so under circumstances in which a reasonable person should have 
known that the same type of abuse that occurred would in fact occur.”). 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 216, 377 P.3d at 573. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 214–17, 377 P.3d at 573–74. 
168 Id.  
2020] Applying Oregon’s Abuse of a Vulnerable Person Statute to 353 
Date Rape Cases: Defendants Are in Treble
occurs within the scope of employment and could extend beyond it. In 
other words, the result element is limited by the chain of causation 
rather than by the scope of employment. 
In the Common-Law Bob hypothetical, Bethany’s employment put 
her in a position to take advantage of patrons like Victor who were 
overly intoxicated. If Bob had not scheduled Bethany on the night she 
assaulted Victor, then she wouldn’t have had the opportunity to use her 
employment to take advantage of Victor’s vulnerability. Therefore, 
Bob’s act of scheduling Bethany for that night made the abuse possible, 
which would probably meet the result element.  
The circumstances element (i.e., the abuse) could be met, for 
example, if an employer fails to investigate previous, similar claims;169 
fails to conduct an adequate investigation into a new employee’s 
background;170 or retains an employee despite previous, similar 
incidents.171 Even though Bob did not actually know of the previous 
similar claims, he could have known by simply checking his voicemail. 
Indeed, a reasonable person likely would have checked his customer 
complaint voicemails regularly—especially considering his new hire, 
Bethany, who had been fired for sexual harassment before. If Bob had 
kept an adequate system of responding to customer complaints or used 
the system he had in place, he could have known that Bethany was 
doing this before she assaulted Victor. He could have fired Bethany or 
at least taken measures to prevent her from doing it again. Instead, even 
though he could have reasonably discovered circumstances indicating 
that abuse like the abuse that Victor suffered would occur, Bob 
continued scheduling Bethany without adequate supervision. 
Accordingly, Bob would likely be liable for permitting Bethany to 
abuse Victor.  
b. Comparing Permission Liability to Common-Law Theories of
Third-Party Liability
Third-party liability for permission is at least equivalent (and
probably better) for Victor (and other plaintiffs with similar claims) 
compared to the common-law theories of third-party battery liability. 
Consider the limitations of several of the common-law claims to see 
the potential roadblocks for plaintiffs in date rape cases:  
169 Id. at 231–34, 377 P.3d at 582–83. 
170 See id. at 230, 377 P.3d at 581 (stating a constructive knowledge standard). 
171 Id. at 211, 377 P.3d at 582–83. 
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• Negligent hiring and retention requires a special relationship
between the plaintiff and the third party.172
• Respondeat superior is limited to the employment relationship
between the third party and the abuser, and it requires that the
underlying abuse occur within the scope of employment.173
• Aiding and assisting requires a tortious intention or knowledge
of the particular abuse to the particular plaintiff.174
Permission liability, on the other hand, creates liability against 
anybody whose knowing conduct (by act or omission) has the effect of 
permitting the underlying abuse to occur (whether the abuse is within 
the scope of employment or not) if a reasonable person would have 
known similar abuse would occur. For example, Victor might sue Bob 
for the common-law tort of negligent hiring and retention of 
Bethany.175 Indeed, employers in Oregon owe a duty to invitees that 
can make employers liable for negligent retention of an employee with 
a propensity to commit battery when that employee commits the 
battery.176 The employer must have known, or should have known, of 
the employee’s propensity to commit battery.177  
But for several reasons, the common-law claim may fail to hold 
employers liable. First, the attack may not have been foreseeable. 
Bethany’s known propensity for sexual harassment isn’t the same as a 
propensity for sexually abusing vulnerable customers. Indeed, in 
Kelley, an employer’s knowledge of his employee’s “quarrelsome” 
propensities was insufficient to make the employer liable for that 
employee’s battery.178 Furthermore, Bob could argue that he was not 
negligent because he was in regular contact with all his employees 
172 OREGON STATE BAR, 2 TORTS § 1.4-1(b) (2012) [hereinafter TORTS]. 
173 Id. § 1.4-1(a). 
174 Id. § 1.4-7. 
175 Id. § 1.4-1(b) (“Evidence that an employer failed to fire an employee after a co-
worker complained of a sexual battery created a question for the jury as to whether the 
employer was liable for a second sexual battery by the employee against the co-worker due 
to negligent retention of the offending employee. Gresham v. Safeway, Inc., No. 08-6241-
AA, 2010 WL 437982 (D. Or. 2010). In Hoke v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 133 Or. App. 410, 
891 P.2d 686 (1995), the plaintiff was sexually assaulted by a security guard after being 
detained by the guard for shoplifting. The court of appeals held that questions of fact 
remained as to whether the defendant failed to reasonably investigate a prior sexual 
misconduct complaint against the guard and failed to ensure that its employees complied 
with security policies, thus rendering it reasonably foreseeable that ‘the harm that befell 
plaintiff would occur.’ Hoke, 133 Or. App. at 421.”). 
176 Hansen v. Cohen, 203 Or. 157, 160–61, 276 P.2d 391, 393 (1955). 
177 Cain v. Rijken, 300 Or. 706, 714–15, 717 P.2d 140, 145–46 (1986). 
178 Kelley v. Oregon Shipbuilding Corp., 183 Or. 1, 8, 189 P.2d 105 (1948). 
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throughout Bethany’s employment to make sure that Bethany was not 
sexually harassing them. His failure to check the customer complaint 
voicemail was not unreasonable because he expected the voice mailbox 
to give customers only a cathartic outlet for their grievances; he never 
expected to receive such grave complaints there.  
Finally, Bob may escape liability for negligently hiring or retaining 
Bethany because he didn’t owe Victor a duty of care for Bethany’s 
behavior after hours and off the premises. The special duty element, 
too, could likely help Bob escape liability because Oregon courts have 
construed that requirement narrowly. This special duty is based upon 
the victim’s invitee status, which extends only as far as the invitation 
itself.179 In Napier, for example, a plaintiff who fell down the stairs on 
his way to the restroom was not an invitee even though he was an 
invitee before he made his way to the restroom.180 The plaintiff had 
gone to the church to talk to a minister and asked the minister if he 
could use the restroom.181 His trip to the restroom was outside the 
scope of his invitation.182  
Here, Bob’s bar had made last call, Victor had left the bar and was 
finding his way home, and Bethany had clocked out for the night before 
she ever laid eyes on Victor. Furthermore, the battery occurred at 
Bethany’s house after hours. If a trip to the restroom on the premises is 
outside the scope of an invitation, like it was in Napier, then it seems 
absurd that Bethany’s house would be within the scope of Victor’s 
invitation to Bob’s bar that night. Victor wouldn’t have this issue with 
a permission claim, which has no special relationship requirement.  
Victor might also sue Bob under a vicarious liability theory, but he 
will likely be unsuccessful here as well. The doctrine of respondeat 
superior makes employers liable for battery committed by employees 
in the scope of their employment.183 Scope of employment has three 
elements: (1) the battery “occurred substantially within the time and 
space limits authorized by the employment”; (2) “the employee was 
motivated, at least partially, by a purpose to serve the employer”; and 
(3) “the act is of a kind which the employee was hired to perform.”184 
This theory of liability is mostly limited to employers whose employees 
179 Hansen, 203 Or. at 162, 276 P.2d at 393–94. 
180 Napier v. First Congregational Church, 157 Or. 110, 113, 70 P.2d 43, 44 (1937). 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Chesterman v. Barmon, 305 Or. 439, 442, 753 P.2d 404, 406 (1988). 
184 Id. 
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use force as part of their job.185 As a bouncer, Bethany’s job description 
arguably includes force, but the act of kissing patrons like Victor is not 
the kind of force Bob hired her to perform; nor was it done to serve the 
employer’s purpose; nor did it occur within the time and space limits 
of employment. Accordingly, it is very unlikely Bob would be liable 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior.  
Finally, Bob is also unlikely to be liable for aiding and assisting the 
battery.186 This form of liability requires that the third party 
intentionally assist the offender with the knowledge that the battery was 
occurring or would occur.187 Bob did not intend for Bethany to sexually 
batter Victor when he scheduled her or when he failed to supervise her. 
Further, unlike permission—which requires only negligence that abuse 
of the same type was occurring or would occur188—the aiding and 
assisting theory of liability would likely fail against Bob because he did 
not have actual knowledge of this battery.  
II 
INTERPRETING ABUSE OF A VULNERABLE PERSON TO APPLY TO 
DATE RAPE 
In this Part, I will analyze the vulnerable person statute’s provisions 
to show how an Oregon court could interpret those provisions to apply 
to date rape. I will return to the hypothetical date rape survivors—
Andy, Victor, and Pauline—throughout this Part to help illustrate how 
a court could find that they were incapacitated within the meaning of 
the statute. 
Oregon statutes are interpreted using a distinct methodology 
prescribed by the Oregon Legislature in chapter 174 of the Oregon 
Revised Statutes.189 The interpreting court’s goal is to ascertain the 
legislature’s actual intent.190 Courts use a two-step methodology to 
achieve that goal: (a) the court examines the text and context of the 
185 TORTS, supra note 172, § 1.4-1(a). 
186 Walthers v. Gossett, 148 Or. App. 548, 553–54, 941 P.2d 575, 578–79 (1997). 
187 Id.; see also TORTS, supra note 172, § 1.4-7 (offering a further discussion of the 
aiding and assisting theory of battery). 
188 Wyers v. Am. Med. Response Nw., Inc., 360 Or. 211, 228–30, 377 P.3d 570, 
580–81. 
189 See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 174.010–590 (2017); State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160, 170–74, 
206 P.3d 1042, 1050–51 (2009); see also Powell’s Books, Inc. v. Kroger, 622 F.3d 1202, 
1209 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 925 (9th 
Cir. 2004)). (stating the rule that federal courts must interpret state statutes as that state’s 
highest court would interpret the statute). 
190 OR. REV. STAT. § 174.020. 
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statute using the relevant rules of statutory construction and legislative 
history to determine if the legislature’s intent has been unambiguously 
expressed, and (b) if the legislature’s intent remains ambiguous, the 
court resolves the ambiguity using the general maxims of statutory 
construction.191 
A. First-Level Analysis 
In pursuing the Oregon Legislature’s actual intent, Oregon courts 
give the most weight to the statute’s text and context.192 The legislature 
used the statute’s text and context to give expression to its intent; 
therefore, the courts reason, the statute’s text and context is the most 
persuasive evidence of legislative intent.193 
1. Text
The vulnerable person statute’s text supports its progressive
application to date rape claims. When the legislature defines a term, 
that meaning controls.194 Here, the legislature defined both “abuse” 
and “vulnerable person.”195  
The statute defines abuse as “conduct . . . that would constitute” 
sexual abuse (and various other crimes) as defined by the criminal 
provisions referenced within the statute.196 Sexual contact without the 
victim’s consent constitutes sexual abuse.197 Date rape includes sexual 
contact without the victim’s consent, so date rape very likely falls 
within the definition of abuse.  
A vulnerable person is a person who is elderly, financially incapable, 
incapacitated, or disabled.198 A person is incapacitated when “[his] 
ability to receive and evaluate information effectively or to 
communicate decisions is impaired to such an extent that [he] presently 
lacks the capacity to meet the essential requirements for [his] physical 
health or safety.”199 According to this text, the victim must have either 
191 Gaines, 346 Or. at 164, 206 P.3d at 1046. 
192 Id. at 171, 206 P.3d at 1050. 
193 Id. 
194 See, e.g., Patton v. Target Corp., 349 Or. 230, 239, 242 P.3d 611, 616 (2010). 
195 OR. REV. STAT. § 124.105(1) (defining abuse); Id. § 124.100(1) (defining vulnerable 
person). 
196 Id. § 124.105(1). 
197 Id. § 163.415. 
198 Id. § 124.100(1)(e) (emphasis added). 
199 Id. § 125.005(5) (emphasis added).  
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an impaired ability to receive and evaluate information or an impaired 
ability to communicate decisions.  
Further, the impairment must be severe enough that the victim 
“presently lacks the capacity to meet the essential requirements for 
[his] physical health or safety.”200 The capacity to meet the essential 
requirements for a person’s physical health or safety is the capacity to 
take “those actions necessary to provide the health care, food, shelter, 
clothing, personal hygiene and other care without which serious 
physical injury or illness is likely to occur.”201 A person whose 
perception or communication abilities prevent him from taking those 
necessary actions is incapacitated. Herring held that severity did not 
imply a durational requirement,202 but other aspects of severity could 
be subject to judicial interpretation.  
For example, a court might need to interpret the statute to determine 
whether the hypothetical survivors—Andy, Victor, and Pauline—were 
incapacitated within the meaning of the statute. Pauline and Andy were 
both unable to communicate their lack of consent when they were 
assaulted.203 In other words, their ability to communicate this decision 
was impaired. Victor was so intoxicated that he was unable to perceive 
the abuse or make a conscious decision about whether to consent when 
he was assaulted.204 In other words, his ability to receive and evaluate 
information was impaired. The question could become whether the 
survivors’ abilities were impaired severely enough at the time of their 
abuse. 
a. Ejusdem Generis
According to Oregon case law, the rule of ejusdem generis can be
applied to interpret the scope of a general catchall term that appends a 
list of specific terms.205 The definition of incapacity employs a list of 
200 Herring interpreted “presently” to mean “at the time of the abuse.” Herring v. Am. 
Med. Response Nw., Inc., 255 Or. App. 315, 321–22, 297 P.3d 9, 14 (2013); see also infra 
Part I. Oregon courts consider prior judicial construction in the analysis of a statute’s text. 
State v. Bryan, 221 Or. App. 455, 459, 190 P.3d 470, 472 (2008). However, because Herring 
was decided by the Oregon Court of Appeals, the precedential effect of its interpretation 
will not bind the Oregon Supreme Court—there, its interpretation will have to stand upon 
the strength of its own reasoning. 
201 OR. REV. STAT. § 125.005(5). 
202 Herring, 255 Or. App. at 319–20, 297 P.3d at 13. 
203 See supra Part I. 
204 See supra Part I. 
205 Daniel N. Gordon, P.C. v. Rosenblum, 361 Or. 352, 64–65, 393 P.3d 1122, 1129 
(2017). 
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specific terms (“health care, food, shelter, clothing, personal hygiene”) 
followed by a general catchall term (“and other care without which 
serious physical injury or illness is likely to occur”) to explain what it 
means to be able to meet the essential requirements for physical health 
or safety.206 Therefore, a court could apply ejusdem generis to interpret 
the severity with which a person’s ability to evaluate information or 
communicate decisions must be impaired.207  
Under ejusdem generis, the common characteristics of the specific 
terms in the list define the scope of the general term.208 A court 
applying ejusdem generis will have some flexibility with which to 
describe the scope of the common characteristics;209 however, the rule 
cannot be applied to lead to a result at odds with the legislature’s 
intentions.210 
The specific terms that the vulnerable person statute lists are “health 
care, food, shelter, clothing, [and] personal hygiene.”211 Without health 
care, food, or personal hygiene care, a person’s health is at risk. 
Without shelter or clothing, a person’s bodily safety is at risk. Each of 
these items, then, is essential to the integrity of either a person’s health 
or a person’s bodily safety.212 This description of the specific terms’ 
common characteristics is consistent with the legislature’s intentions 
because, according to the statute’s text, the listed terms are employed 
to help define the essential requirements for “a person’s physical health 
and safety.”213 The integrity of a person’s health and bodily safety fall 
206 OR. REV. STAT. § 125.005(5). 
207 See id. § 125.005(5). 
208 See, e.g., Bellikka v. Green, 306 Or. 630, 636, 762 P.2d 997, 1001 (1988) (“[W]hen 
the legislature chooses to state both a general standard and a list of specifics, the specifics 
do more than place their particular subjects beyond the dispute; they also refer the scope of 
the general standard to matters of the same kind, often phrased in Latin as ‘ejusdem 
generis.’”). 
209 Jack L. Landau, Oregon Statutory Construction, 97 OR. L. REV. 583, 684–85 (2019). 
210 See, e.g., Clinical Research Inst. of S. Or., P.C. v. Kemper Ins. Cos., 191 Or. App. 
595, 603, 84 P.3d 147, 152 (2004); State v. Mayorga, 186 Or. App. 175, 181–82, 62 P.3d 
818, 822 (2003) (stating that the rule “does not apply when its application would lead to 
redundancy or to a construction that otherwise is at odds with the legislature’s apparent 
intentions.”). 
211 OR. REV. STAT. § 125.005(5). 
212 Interestingly, these two categories are perfectly in line with the two most basic 
categories in Maslow’s “hierarchy of needs,” see A.H. Maslow, A Theory of Human 
Motivation, 50 PSYCHOL. REV. 370, 372–80 (1943), which makes sense because these are 
the categories of need “without which serious physical injury or illness is most likely to 
occur,” accord OR. REV. STAT. § 125.005(5). 
213 See OR. REV. STAT. § 125.005(5). 
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within the scope of that intention. Therefore, using ejusdem generis, a 
court could interpret the definition to mean that a person’s evaluative 
or communicative abilities must be impaired to such an extent that he 
is unable to protect his bodily integrity. 
Andy, Victor, and Pauline would probably fall under this 
interpretation of the statute’s definition of incapacity. Because of either 
prior trauma or voluntary intoxication, neither Andy, Victor, nor 
Pauline was able to take the necessary actions to ward off their dates’ 
unwanted kissing.214 Pauline and Andy were both unable to 
communicate their lack of consent when they were assaulted.215 Victor 
was unable to perceive and evaluate information effectively enough to 
express or make a conscious decision about whether to consent when 
he was assaulted.216 Because each of them was unable to prevent the 
assault because of their impairment at the time of abuse, their 
individual impairments were each sufficient to impair their ability to 
maintain bodily integrity. Accordingly, under this interpretation of the 
statute, Andy, Victor, and Pauline were probably vulnerable persons at 
the time of their abuse. 
b. Noscitur a Sociis
Oregon courts also use noscitur a sociis to interpret statutes at the
first level of analysis.217 Noscitur a sociis is used to interpret a disputed 
statutory term by inferring its meaning from the surrounding words.218 
A court could find noscitur a sociis useful in construing 
the definition of incapacity. To be incapacitated, a person’s 
communication or perception must be impaired to such an extent that 
they are unable to take the “care without which serious physical injury 
or illness is likely to occur.”219 Applying noscitur a sociis, the statute 
says that the person must be unable to render the care necessary to 
prevent serious physical injury or illness.  
Using this interpretation, the question becomes whether the ability 
to communicate a person’s lack of consent to sexual contact or to 
perceive the contact prevents him from taking the care necessary to 
prevent serious physical injury or illness. A court could construe this 
necessary care requirement narrowly or broadly.  
214 See supra Part I. 
215 See supra Part I. 
216 See supra Part I. 
217 Landau, supra note 209, at 688 n.584 (collecting cases). 
218 Id.  
219 OR. REV. STAT. § 125.005(5) (2017). 
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In the broadest construction, the care to be taken does not need to be 
closely related to the facts of the case. Victor’s perception, for example, 
was impaired to such an extent that he was unable to drive himself 
home without putting himself at significant risk of physical injury from 
a drunk driving accident. He didn’t drive himself home, but for the 
same reason—impaired perception—he was unable to prevent himself 
from being assaulted. So, because Victor was unable to drive without 
risking serious physical injury, a court could consider him 
incapacitated under the definition because the necessary care 
requirement doesn’t need to be closely related to the facts of the case 
under the broad construction.  
In the narrowest construction, only the facts of the case could be 
considered, and the court will have to decide whether the assault was 
likely to lead to serious physical injury or illness. Because Victor’s 
assault consisted only of fervent kissing, Victor’s claim may fail under 
a narrow construction. However, even under the narrowest 
construction, a court could decide in Victor’s favor because even a 
relatively mild sexual assault, like the one Victor sustained, could lead 
to serious mental illness like PTSD. Furthermore, a court could 
consider the assault itself to be a serious physical injury under the 
theory that any breach of a person’s bodily integrity is a serious injury. 
Alternatively, a court could construe the statute somewhat less 
narrowly and ask whether any assault could have led to a serious 
physical injury because of Victor’s inability to ward off this assault. 
After all, the terms of the statute don’t require the serious physical 
injury to have actually occurred; the statute requires only that serious 
physical injury or illness is likely to occur because of the inability. 
Under this construction, a court could decide that serious physical 
injury or illness is likely to occur from an inability to prevent assault.  
c. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
Oregon courts can also apply expressio unius to interpret statutes at
the first level of analysis.220 The rule states that when a statute lists 
terms without a general catchall term, the legislature intended the list 
to be exhaustive.221 The strength of the inference created by the rule 
220 Landau, supra note 209, at 689 n.588 (collecting cases). 
221 Id. at 689. 
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increases with the length of the list and with the specificity with which 
the terms are stated.222  
The definition of incapacity seems to employ an exhaustive list when 
it states that the requisite impairment must result from a diminished 
ability “to receive and evaluate information effectively or to 
communicate decisions.”223 Although the statute lists only two terms, 
the terms are sufficiently specific to support the inference that the 
legislature intended it to be exhaustive. Indeed, courts have interpreted 
this list to be exhaustive.224 Accordingly, a plaintiff’s incapacity must 
result from either a diminished ability to receive and evaluate 
information effectively or a diminished ability to communicate 
decisions. 
2. Context
The statute’s context, like the statute’s text, is considered at the first
level of analysis. Under Oregon case law, prior versions of the same 
statute provide relevant context for interpreting the present version of 
the statute.225 Courts look at the history of changes to infer the meaning 
of the present version.226 For example, when a dissolution of marriage 
statute authorized spousal support as compensation when a spouse had 
contributed to the other’s earning capacity, the Oregon Supreme Court 
turned to the history of the statute’s changes to infer its meaning in the 
case of In re Marriage of Harris.227 The legislature had amended the 
statute about a decade before this case was decided.228 The amendment 
had added more types of contributions that will qualify for 
compensation in a dissolution.229 By broadening the types of 
qualifying contributions, the court concluded, the legislature intended 
the statute to apply more often.230 Accordingly, the supreme court 
applied a liberal construction of the statute.231 
222 Crimson Trace Corp. v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, 355 Or. 476, 497, 326 P.3d 
1181, 1195 (2014). 
223 OR. REV. STAT. § 125.005(5). 
224 See, e.g., Schaefer v. Schaefer, 183 Or. App. 513, 518–19, 52 P.3d 1125, 1128–29 
(2002). 
225 Landau, supra note 209, at 645 n.342 (collecting cases). 
226 Id.  
227 In re Marriage of Harris, 349 Or. 393, 244 P.3d 801 (2010). 
228 See id. at 404–05, 244 P.3d at 808–10. 
229 Id. at 408, 244 P.3d at 810. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
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Like the dissolution of marriage statute, the vulnerable person 
statute has been amended to broaden its application since its original 
enactment in 1995. In fact, the vulnerable person statute has been 
amended repeatedly since its original enactment, and each amendment 
has broadened its application. Moreover, the Oregon legislature has 
expanded the vulnerable person statute’s scope in every imaginable 
way since its original enactment in 1995 by expanding: (1) the class of 
protected individuals, (2) the definition of abuse, and (3) the available 
remedies. Importantly, the legislature has never narrowed the statute’s 
scope; the modifications have only enhanced the statute’s usefulness.  
First, the class of protected individuals who can seek redress through 
an abuse of a vulnerable person claim has expanded significantly since 
the statute’s original enactment. The legislature extended the statute’s 
protections to incapacitated and financially incapable persons in 
1997,232 and again to disabled persons in 2005.233 The legislature also 
loosened the standing requirements twice, thereby allowing more 
people to bring abuse of a vulnerable person claims on behalf of the 
survivor.234 The 2001 amendment conferred standing upon the 
“personal representative for the estate of a decedent who was 
incapacitated or [elderly] at the time of death.”235 The 2005 
amendment conferred standing upon trustees because the survivor’s 
trustee likely has familiarity with the dealings of the survivor.236 In 
2003, the legislature also authorized district attorneys and the Attorney 
General to issue investigative demands in cases of abuse of a vulnerable 
person.237 In sum, the legislature has expanded the class of protected 
individuals by adding new groups to the class, conferring standing upon 
more representative parties, and authorizing the Attorney General and 
district attorneys to issue investigative demands. 
232 Act of May 7, 1997, ch. 249, § 41, 1997 Or. Laws 44–45 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 125.005).
233 Act of June 17, 2005, ch. 386, §§ 1–2, 2005 Or. Laws 3–4 (codified at OR. REV. 
STAT. §§ 124.100 and 124.110). 
234 Act of July 2, 2001, ch. 843, § 3, 2001 Or. Laws 1–2 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 124.100); Act of May 6, 2005, ch. 87, § 1, 2005 Or. Laws 1–2 (codified at OR. REV. STAT.
§ 124.100).
235 Act of Apr. 18, 2001, ch. 84, 2001 Or. Laws 1–2 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 673.685).
236 2005 Or. Laws 1–2, supra note 233; Hearings on H.B. 2291 Before the H. Comm. on 
Judiciary Civ. L. Subcomm., 73d Or. Legis. Assemb. (Jan. 31, 2005), audio recording at 
26:00 [hereinafter H. Hearings on H.B. 2291]. 
237 Act of May 19, 2003, ch. 265, § 1, 2003 Or. Laws 1–2 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 124.125).
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Second, the statutory definition of abuse has been expanded twice. 
First, in 1999, the legislature expanded the definition to include sending 
sweepstakes promotions to elderly or incapacitated persons.238 Then, 
in 2003, it expanded the definition of abuse again to include 
strangulation.239 
Third and finally, the available remedies were expanded 
significantly in 2003. Specifically, the 2003 amendments require courts 
to award treble economic and noneconomic damages (and reasonable 
attorney’s fees).240 The legislature sought to increase the likelihood 
that vulnerable survivors could recover in a civil action pragmatically 
by enacting the treble damages provision.241  
According to the supreme court’s logic in Harris, the vulnerable 
person statute’s consistent expansion implies that the legislature 
intended for the statute to apply more often, and a court should apply a 
broad construction and application to the vulnerable person statute.242 
According to case law, the statute certainly applies to some sexual 
assault survivors who were temporarily incapacitated at the time of 
their abuse. Although it could be argued that the legislature didn’t 
intend for the statute to apply as far as date rape, the consistent 
broadening of the statute’s application suggests otherwise. A court 
interpreting whether the vulnerable person statute applies to redress 
date rape should infer that the legislature intended the statute to apply 
238 Act of July 8, 1999, ch. 875, § 6, 1999 Or. Laws 4 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 124.005).
239 Act of July 1, 2003, ch. 577, § 4, 2003 Or. Laws 2–3 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 124.105).
240 Act of May 15, 2003, ch. 211, § 1, 2003 Or. Laws 1 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 124.100).
241 See H. Hearings on H.B. 2449, supra note 118, at 35:55 (comments of Rep. M. 
Williams, Chair); S. Hearings on H.B. 2449, supra note 118, at 10:30 (testimony of Senator 
Charles Ringo, one of the bill’s sponsors). 
242 Oregon appellate courts have been consistently unwilling to accept arguments for 
narrow statutory interpretations of incapacity based on the legislative intent in sexual assault 
cases. Wyers v. Am. Med. Response Nw., Inc., 360 Or. 211, 214, 377 P.3d 570, 572 (2016) 
(affirming appellate court’s decision that third-party liability for permission does not require 
actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s abuse); id. at 226, 579 (rejecting defendant’s argument 
that the legislature did not intend to create liability for institutional care or service 
providers); Herring v. Am. Med. Response Nw., Inc., 255 Or. App. 315, 317, 297 P.3d 9, 
12 (2013) (rejecting defendant’s arguments that (1) “because plaintiff was not incapacitated 
for an extended period of time, she was not a ‘vulnerable person’ as that term is defined by 
statute”; and (2) the trial court “erred in tripling [plaintiff’s] noneconomic damages 
[because] doing so resulted in an award that exceeded a statutorily mandated $500,000 cap 
on noneconomic damages, or was excessively punitive, or both.”), cert. denied, 353 Or. 867 
(2013). 
2020] Applying Oregon’s Abuse of a Vulnerable Person Statute to 365 
Date Rape Cases: Defendants Are in Treble
broadly. Therefore, a court should find that the statute applies to date 
rape claims. 
The legislative history of a statute also provides relevant context for 
interpreting the legislature’s intent under Oregon case law.243 The 
legislature had pragmatic intentions when it enacted the treble damages 
provision.244 Testimony before the judiciary committee offered that 
financial abuse of senior citizens was underreported, underprosecuted, 
and had become more prevalent.245 Accordingly, the legislature sought 
to make recovery easier for vulnerable survivors.246 Specifically, the 
legislature hoped the treble damages provision would encourage 
pretrial settlement and encourage vulnerable survivors to pursue these 
claims.247 This approach was warranted for several reasons: senior 
citizens were often poor witnesses to their own abuse at trial because 
of memory issues;248 they were often too embarrassed to testify about 
being abused;249 and they were common targets of such abuse.250  
The legislature’s pragmatic intention to encourage survivors to step 
forward and sue their abusers and defendants to settle before trial 
extends easily to date rape claims.251 Indeed, date rape—like the other 
forms of abuse covered by the statute—is underreported, 
underprosecuted, and extremely prevalent.252 Offenders often leave 
little or no physical evidence and seek victims who are vulnerable, 
243 State v. Gaines, 346 Or. at 160, 172, 206 P.3d 1042, 1050–51 (2009) “[A] party is 
free to proffer legislative history to the court, and the court will consult it after examining 
text and context, even if the court does not perceive an ambiguity in the statute’s text, where 
that legislative history appears useful to the court’s analysis.”). 
244 See H. Hearings on H.B. 2449, supra note 118, at 35:55 (comments of Rep. M. 
Williams, Chair); S. Hearings on H.B. 2449, supra note 118, at 10:30 (testimony by Senator 
Charles Ringo, one of the bill’s sponsors). 
245 H. Hearings on H.B. 2449, supra note 118, at 22:00 (testimony of Steven Schneider, 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Government Kulongoski); S. Hearings on H.B. 2449, supra note 
118, at 11:15 (testimony by Senator Charles Ringo, one of the bill’s sponsors). 
246 H. Hearings on H.B. 2449, supra note 118, at 35:55 (comments of Rep. M. Williams, 
Chair); S. Hearings on H.B. 2449, supra note 118, at 10:30 (testimony by Senator Charles 
Ringo, one of the bill’s sponsors). 
247 S. Hearings on H.B. 2449, supra note 118, at 11:35 (testimony by Senator Charles 
Ringo, one of the bill’s sponsors). 
248 Id. at 18:28 (testimony of Virginia Mitchell, attorney who represents seniors). 
249 Id. 
250 Id. at 23:45 (testimony of Steven Schneider, Deputy Chief of Staff for Government 
Kulongoski). 
251 In any case, the statutory language clearly applies to both situations, which is likely 
dispositive regardless of silence on the matter in the legislative history. See, e.g., Lake 
Oswego Pres. Soc’y v. City of Lake Oswego, 360 Or. 115, 129, 379 P.3d 462, 471 (2016). 
252 SART HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 1. 
366 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98, 325 
isolated, and easily discredited.253 Furthermore, survivors who were 
incapacitated make poor witnesses to their own abuse. Survivors may 
have been unable to perceive the abuse, their trauma might cause 
memory issues, and they are often too embarrassed to testify about 
being abused.254 
The Whalen case illustrates how those issues could prevent sexual 
assault survivors who were incapacitated at the time of their abuse from 
stepping forward or from succeeding at trial. In Whalen, the plaintiff 
had no recollection of being sexually abused while she was 
incapacitated.255 However, circumstantial evidence suggested that she 
had been abused by the defendant: the defendant had acted aroused 
while watching her undress; she had a great sense of uncleanliness 
afterwards; she became hypervigilant; she experienced nightmares of 
the defendant hovering over her; and the defendant had been found 
guilty of sexually abusing other incapacitated women at his job, which 
was where he had abused the plaintiff.256 
Because the plaintiff had no recollection of the abuse itself due to 
her incapacity at the time of the abuse, she was unsure it had occurred 
until almost four years later. She became aware of the abuse when her 
symptoms of trauma had continued, and the other women had come 
forward in a highly publicized procession.257 Only under these 
exceptional circumstances did she file her claim.258 
At the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff’s attorney proffered a 
sworn affidavit stating that he had retained an expert who would testify 
that the plaintiff was subjected to traumatic sexual abuse while she was 
under the defendant’s care. The affidavit also stated that the retained 
expert would testify that the reason the plaintiff could not remember 
the abuse was because of amnesia induced by the trauma of the 
abuse.259 Nevertheless, the trial court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant, ruling that there was no genuine issue of 
253 Id. at 48. 
254 See id. at 8 n.vi (“Instrumental violence—the amount of violence or threat of violence 
used by the offender is only as much as is needed to commit the sexual assault. For example, 
an offender will use little or no violence to perpetrate against someone who is incapacitated 
by alcohol or drugs, which is why alcohol and drugs are so often used by an offender to 
create vulnerability in a potential victim.”). 
255 Whalen v. Am. Med. Response Nw., Inc., 256 Or. App. 278, 280, 300 P.3d 247, 249 
(2013). 
256 Id. at 280–81, 300 P.3d at 249–50. 
257 Id. at 281, 300 P.3d at 250. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
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material fact because the plaintiff herself could not credibly testify that 
the abuse had occurred.260 
The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was enough 
evidence in the record to create a genuine issue of material fact.261 The 
court reasoned that some survivors won’t recall their injury, but that 
such survivors could rely on evidence other than their own 
testimony.262 Accordingly, the issue was a jury question and summary 
judgment was inappropriate.263  
However, the plaintiff would still need to prove her case, and her 
lack of memory would certainly put her at a disadvantage at trial. 
Furthermore, although the attorney’s affidavit was enough to defeat 
summary judgment, the expert’s testimony still may have been 
inadmissible at trial.264 If the expert’s testimony were not admitted, the 
Whalen plaintiff would be left with evidence that the defendant acted 
aroused while watching her undress, that the defendant had sexually 
abused other incapacitated women at his job, and that the plaintiff 
experienced hypervigilance, nightmares, and feelings of uncleanliness 
afterwards.265 The jury might have attributed the plaintiff’s subsequent 
feelings to the defendant’s behavior while she was undressing. The jury 
might also have attributed the plaintiff’s claims of abuse to the publicity 
about the other women’s abuse. Without the expert’s testimony, these 
theories could seem more credible to the jury. 
The issues exhibited by Whalen are the same issues the legislature 
intended to address by enacting the treble damages provision. Because 
of her incapacity at the time of her abuse, the Whalen plaintiff did not 
report or prosecute her abuse until much later when exceptional 
circumstances prompted her to do so. Even then, her incapacity posed 
evidentiary issues for her claim because she could not recall her own 
abuse. Accordingly, the pragmatic intention of encouraging plaintiffs 
to bring claims and encouraging defendants to settle before trials 
applies to survivors of date rape.  
The legislature also hoped the mandatory treble damages award 
would discourage the abuse of vulnerable persons because the abuse 
260 Id. at 280–81, 300 P.3d at 250–51. 
261 Id. at 292–93, 300 P.3d at 255–56. 
262 Id. at 289, 300 P.3d at 254. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 291 n.9, 300 P.3d at 255. 
265 See id. at 288–89, 300 P.3d at 254. 
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also tended to have significant effects on the survivors’ health.266 The 
legislature was concerned about the detrimental effects of abuse on 
vulnerable survivors themselves as well as on society as a whole.267 
Survivors of date rape experience many symptoms ranging from lost 
work productivity, substance abuse, trauma, disrupted relationships, 
and significant personality changes.268 These symptoms have 
detrimental effects on the survivors themselves and on society as a 
whole. Accordingly, the effects of abuse on date rape survivors’ health 
are the same effects the legislature intended to prevent by discouraging 
such abuse with the treble damages provision. 
In conclusion, the statutory provisions were intended to create a 
solid legal remedy for a broad class of vulnerable victims of a broad 
range of abuse because of deficiencies in the existing law. There is no 
reason the law should not benefit date rape survivors—another class of 
vulnerable victims. 
B. Second-Level Analysis 
After the first-level analysis, an interpreting court may still find the 
legislature’s intent ambiguous as to the vulnerable person statute’s 
applicability to date rape claims. If so, the court will use general 
maxims of construction to resolve the ambiguity. One maxim that 
Oregon courts use at the second level of analysis is the rule that 
remedial statutes are broadly construed.269 This rule permits the court 
to choose the more liberal construction when more than one reasonable 
construction is possible and the statute’s purpose is remedial.270 Under 
this rule’s narrowest definition, the statute’s purpose is remedial when 
the statute was enacted to address inadequacies of the common law.271 
Oregon courts have applied this rule even more broadly and found that 
266 H. Hearings on H.B. 2449, supra note 118, at 24:00. 
267 See SART HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 1. (“The effects of sexual assault are far-
reaching and may include financial consequences in the form of low work productivity or 
missed time, health consequences in the form of substance abuse or depression, and social 
consequences in the form of broken relationships, fear, trauma, and a changed world view. 
The discrepancy between incidence and reporting has significant consequences on 
community safety, particularly when combined with the small number of cases that result in 
criminal charges and the even smaller number of sex offenders who are ultimately 
convicted.”). 
268 Id. at 1. 
269 Landau, supra note 209, at 724. 
270 Id. at 725. 
271 Id. at 724 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 86 (1768)). 
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“[s]tatutes pertaining to garnishment of wages to satisfy a debt, 
workers’ compensation benefits, interest and penalties for delinquent 
taxpayers, the rights and property of married women, unemployment 
compensation, relief from judgment, professionalization of fire 
fighters, mechanics’ liens, civil procedure, and stray animals—to pick 
a handful of examples—all” had remedial purposes.272 Indeed, the 
Oregon Court of Appeals even found that the permission provision of 
the vulnerable person statute itself had a remedial purpose.273 
The vulnerable person statute’s purpose is remedial because the 
legislature wanted to provide a remedy for certain survivors of 
abuse.274 Specifically, the original 1995 statute was designed to protect 
elderly and incapacitated individuals in all environments, beyond the 
then existing laws that (the legislature believed) already protected them 
from abuse in nursing homes, residential care facilities, and banks or 
brokerage houses.275 Today, it is well recognized that some sexual 
assault survivors qualify as vulnerable persons.276 The statute should 
provide a remedy to date rape survivors, too, because the common law 
provides an inadequate remedy,277 and the statute is meant to fill gaps 
in legal remedies.278 Given the rule that remedial statutes are broadly 
272 Id. at 724–25. 
273 Wyers v. Am. Med. Response Nw., Inc., 268 Or. App. 232, 251, 342 P.3d 129, 139 
(2014), aff’d on other grounds, 360 Or. 211 (2016). 
274 See id.; Hearings on S.B. 943 Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 68th Or. Legis. 
Assemb. (Apr. 23, 1995), minutes at 4. 
275 Hearings on S.B. 943 Before the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 68th Or. Legis. Assemb. 
(May 12, 1995), exhibit D (statement of Lisa Bertalan, Attorney at Law) (“The Bill is not 
meant to target institutional providers such as nursing homes and foster care homes. As the 
above statistics show, this most often is not where the problem lies and other remedies exist 
to resolve those abuses.”) [hereinafter H. Hearings on S.B. 943]. Ms. Bertalan makes two 
arguments for the exemptions, both of which are worthy of criticism. Her first argument is 
that the exempted institutions are “not where the problem lies.” Id. However, even if that is 
the case, it is no reason to specifically exempt them because they would not be subject to 
liability for something that doesn’t occur there. Her second argument is that there are other 
remedies against these institutions to resolve such abuses. Id. This argument is incongruous 
with the first—it concedes that abuses do occur within these institutions. Furthermore, if an 
adequate remedy already exists in these contexts, why would the institutions need to be 
specifically exempted from the abuse of a vulnerable person remedy? Or, more accurately, 
why should they care? Indeed, the statistics Ms. Bertalan refers to that purportedly show the 
problem doesn’t lie with institutional care providers tell a different story—namely, that 13% 
of elder abuse perpetrators are service providers! Id. at 4. 
276 Wyers, 360 Or. at 227–28, 377 P.3d at 580; Herring, 255 Or. App. at 319–320, 297 
P.3d at 13; Am. Med. Response Nw., Inc. v. Ace Am. Ins., 526 Fed. App’x 754 (9th Cir. 
2013) (unpublished table decision). 
277 See supra Part I. 
278 H. Hearings on S.B. 943, supra note 275, at 4. 
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construed, if a court reaches the second level of analysis when 
interpreting the vulnerable person statute’s application to date rape, 
then it should give the statute a liberal construction and find that the 
statute applies to date rape claims.  
III 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS: 
GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY FOR “PERMISSION” 
Because permission claims are a direct liability theory of third-party 
liability, most third parties will be liable in a similar fashion as 
employers. The vulnerable person statute itself does not require any 
special relationship to create liability. Therefore, permission claims can 
likely be brought against homeowners, vehicle owners, common 
carriers, and other entities or individuals without the extra requirements 
found at common law. Permission claims against state and federal 
governmental institutions, however, would create extra requirements. 
Both types of institutions could be liable for permission, but attorneys 
must consider major procedural limitations before filing such a claim. 
The following Sections explore some of those considerations. 
A. Oregon Tort Claims Act (OTCA) 
As employers, state governmental institutions could be liable for 
permission claims through the Oregon Tort Claims Act (OTCA) in a 
similar, albeit more limited, fashion than other employers.279 
Generally, the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution 
immunizes states, state agencies, and state officials against lawsuits 
seeking money damages in federal court.280 Governmental entities that 
are not “an arm of the [s]tate,” such as municipal corporations, are not 
immune under the Eleventh Amendment.281 The OTCA waived the 
state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity by stating that “every public 
body is subject to civil action for its torts and those of its officers, 
employees and agents acting within the scope of their employment or 
duties, whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary 
function.”282 The OTCA is the “sole cause of action” authorized 
against the state for the acts of state officers, employees, or agents of 
279 See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.260–300 (2018) (OTCA). 
280 See TORTS, supra note 172, § 28.2-10 for further discussion of the interaction of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity and the OTCA. 
281 Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). 
282 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.265(1). 
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the state or of a public body (collectively, “state actors”) acting within 
the scope of employment.283 
Claims for abuse of a vulnerable person against the state are 
precluded from being brought in federal court because of the OTCA’s 
“sole cause of action” provision and the state’s Eleventh Amendment 
immunity.284 Furthermore, some lower federal courts have extended 
the OTCA’s preclusive effect to abuse of a vulnerable person claims 
against municipal corporations where no Eleventh Amendment 
immunity exists.285 Importantly, these decisions seem to assume the 
abuse of a vulnerable person claims are seeking to hold the state liable 
for the abuse itself, and not for permitting the abuse.286 In which case, 
it may be reasonable to assume that abuse was not within the course 
and scope of the state official’s employment (as the OTCA requires). 
Even though there is no backdrop of Eleventh Amendment immunity 
for municipal corporations,287 they do fall within the OTCA’s 
definition of public body.288 Because the OTCA and the vulnerable 
person statute are both state law, the OTCA may be able to have a 
preclusive effect over the vulnerable person statute.289 These lower 
courts thereby seem to assume that the course and scope requirement 
of the sole cause of action provision in the OTCA precludes abuse of a 
vulnerable person claims against any public body, irrespective of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.  
However, a municipal employee’s permission of abuse of a 
vulnerable person could very well be within her scope of 
employment.290 The OTCA waives the state’s sovereign immunity 
283 Id. § 30.265(2). 
284 A.G. v. Or. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2015 WL 5178707, 14 (D. Or. Sept. 3, 2015) 
(“The plain text of the OTCA is quite clear that a plaintiff may not pursue a state-law civil 
action against a state official unless the claim arises out of the OTCA.”). 
285 Estate of Sawyer v. Cent. Or. Cmty. Coll., 2018 WL 2946417, at *7 (D. Or. 2018) 
(dismissing abuse of a vulnerable person claim against community college as precluded by 
the OTCA); Slaughter v. Will, 2016 WL 4087278, at *2 (D. Or. 2016), adopted sub nom., 
2016 WL 4087107 (D. Or. 2016) (dismissing abuse of a vulnerable person claim against 
city police department as precluded by the OTCA). 
286 See Estate of Sawyer, 2018 WL 2946417, at *7; Slaughter, WL 4087278, at *2. 
287 Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). 
288 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.260(4) (2018). 
289 Sanok v. Grimes, 306 Or. 259, 262–63, 760 P.2d 228 (1988). 
290 See supra Section I.B.4. 
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from torts, and a permission claim fits the OTCA’s definition of tort.291 
The OTCA explicitly waives the state’s sovereign immunity for “its 
torts and those of [state actors] acting within the scope of their 
employment or duties.”292 A “tort” is defined elsewhere within the 
OTCA as a “breach of a legal duty that is imposed by law . . . [resulting] 
in injury to a specific person or persons for which the law provides a 
civil right of action.”293 The permission provision of the vulnerable 
person statute provides a cause of action against actors who breach the 
statutorily imposed duty not to permit such abuse.294 Therefore, 
permission claims should be considered torts within the meaning of the 
OTCA. Accordingly, permission claims against municipal corporations 
should not be precluded in the same per se manner that lower federal 
courts have applied to abuse of a vulnerable person claims against 
municipal corporations thus far.  
Regardless, federal courts have so far precluded abuse of a 
vulnerable person claims against state public bodies based on some 
combination of the OTCA’s sole cause of action provision and 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.295 Accordingly, attorneys should 
carefully consider whether to pair an abuse of a vulnerable person claim 
against a state public body with a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim because 
§ 1983 claims must be brought in federal court, and OTCA claims
cannot be brought in federal court.296 
In any case, vulnerable person claims against the state, whether for 
the abuse or the permission of it, will be subject to more limitations and 
more procedures than would the same claim against other third parties. 
For example, suing the state for permission, rather than a private third 
party, would almost certainly reduce the statute of limitations from 
seven years to two years.297 Indeed, the OTCA’s statute of limitations 
291 See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.260–300; see also id. § 30.260(8) (defining tort); id. 
§ 30.265(1) (waiving sovereign immunity); TORTS, supra note 172, § 28.2-3 (defining
“public body”). 
292 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.265(1) (emphasis added). 
293 Id. § 30.260(8). 
294 Id. § 124.100(5) (“An action may be brought under this section against a person for 
permitting another person to engage in physical or financial abuse if the person knowingly 
acts or fails to act under circumstances in which a reasonable person should have known of 
the physical or financial abuse.”). 
295 See cases cited supra notes 282–85. 
296 See, e.g., Estate of Sawyer v. Cent. Or. Cmty. Coll., 2018 WL 2946417, at *7 (D. Or. 
2018). 
297 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.275(9) (defining OTCA statute of limitations); TORTS, supra 
note 172, § 28.2-3 (defining “public body”); see also Dowers Farms, Inc. v. Lake Cty., 288 
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is two years “notwithstanding any other provision of ORS chapter 12 
or other statute providing a limitation on the commencement of an 
action.”298 Case law confirms that the OTCA’s two-year statute of 
limitations precludes any longer statute of limitations provided by the 
underlying claim.299  
The OTCA’s damages cap is worth considering independently,300 
because it differs in important ways from Oregon’s general cap on 
noneconomic damages.301 First, the OTCA’s cap encompasses both 
economic and noneconomic damages.302 Second, the OTCA allows 
plaintiffs to bring claims for damages in excess of the damages cap 
against the individual officer, employee, or agent to hold individually 
liable for the excess amount.303 In that regard, the OTCA’s damages 
cap is more like a limit on the state’s liability in indemnity for its 
officers than a cap on damages. Third, the OTCA damages cap is 
dynamic: the limit that will apply in a particular case depends upon 
whether the claim is being brought against the state itself or a public 
body of the state,304 the number of claimants,305 and the date on which 
Or. 669, 681, 607 P.2d 1361, 1367 (1980) (holding common-law tolling rule applies to 
OTCA statute of limitations). 
298 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.275(9). 
299 See, e.g., Van Wormer v. City of Salem, 309 Or. 404, 408–09, 788 P.2d 443, 445–46 
(1990) (holding OTCA’s two-year statute of limitations applies in wrongful death cases, 
which otherwise have a three-year statute of limitations). 
300  OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.271–72. 
301 Compare id. §§ 30.271–72 (listing the OTCA damages capping provisions), with id. 
§ 31.710(1) (listing the general damages capping provision).
302 Id. §§ 30.271–72. 
303 Id. § 30.265(4). 
304 Compare id. § 30.271 (establishing limits for claims against the state), with id. 
§ 30.272 (establishing limits for claims against public bodies of the state).
305 See id. §§ 30.271–72 (establishing limits for single-claimant awards and higher limits 
for multiple-claimant awards). 
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the cause of action arose.306 In contrast, the general cap limits 
noneconomic damages awards to $500,000 for all claims.307  
The Herring court held that the trebled award mandated by the 
vulnerable person statute can legally exceed the general cap.308 
Whether this same outcome is permissible in the context of the OTCA’s 
damages cap is an undecided question. To be sure, Herring’s reasoning 
could apply just as well to OTCA’s damages cap as it did to the general 
damages cap.309 The trebling provision provides that the court “shall 
award . . . an amount equal to three times all noneconomic 
damages.”310 In Herring, the court reasoned that the trebled portion of 
the award was an amount equal to three times the noneconomic 
damages.311 Therefore, the trebled portion was “more in the nature of 
a fine” than compensation for noneconomic damages and not subject 
to the general cap.312 Because the trebling was not itself an award of 
noneconomic damages, the court held that it was not subject to the 
general cap.313 Furthermore, because the vulnerable person statute was 
enacted by the legislature after the general damages cap provision, the 
court thought it was unlikely the legislature would have enacted the 
trebling provision knowing it would conflict with the damages cap in 
many cases.314 A reviewing court may reach a similar conclusion with 
the OTCA’s damages cap by using similar reasoning as the court 
applied in Herring.  
But a reviewing court may instead reach the opposite conclusion 
with the OTCA damages cap because it can be distinguished from the 
general damages cap based upon statutory language and the date of 
306 See id. § 30.271 (limiting the state’s liability to a single claimant to amounts between 
$1.5–2 million (depending on the date the claim arose) and to all claimants to amounts 
between $3–4 million (depending on the date the claim arose) for claims arising on or after 
December 28, 2007, and before July 1, 2015; and outlining mechanisms for annual increases 
in the limits for claims arising on or after July 1, 2015); id. § 30.272 (limiting the state’s 
liability to a single claimant to amounts between $500,000–666,700 (depending on the date 
the claim arose) and to all claimants to amounts between $1–1.33 million (depending on the 
date the claim arose) for claims arising on or after December 28, 2007, and before July 1, 
2015; and outlining mechanisms for annual increases in the limits for claims arising on or 
after July 1, 2015). 
307 Id. § 31.710(1). 
308 Herring v. Am. Med. Response Nw., Inc., 255 Or. App. 315, 326–27, 297 P.3d 9, 
16–17 (2013); see also supra Part II. 
309 See Herring, 255 Or. App. at 323, 297 P.3d at 14–15; see also supra Part I. 
310 OR. REV. STAT. § 124.100(2)(b). 
311 Herring, 255 Or. App. at 323, 297 P.3d at 14–15. 
312 Id. 
313 Id. 
314 Id. 
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enactment. The general cap, on the one hand, applies only to a portion 
of the award—the noneconomic portion.315 The OTCA damages cap, 
on the other hand, applies to the entire award and limits the state’s 
liability in a given case based on the number of claims and 
claimants.316 Like the general damages cap, the trebling provision of 
the vulnerable person statute applies to specified portions of the award 
(e.g., an amount equal to all noneconomic damages) instead of applying 
to the entire award like the OTCA damages cap.317 The Herring court’s 
reasoning that the trebled portion was not itself an award of 
noneconomic damages and, accordingly, was not subject to the general 
damages cap does not apply as well to the OTCA damages cap.318 
Indeed, OTCA’s damages cap limits the amount that can be awarded 
for an entire claim,319 which could presumably include any trebled 
portion. Furthermore, unlike the general damages cap, the OTCA 
damages cap was enacted after the trebling provision in abuse of a 
vulnerable person.320 It remains to be seen whether a reviewing court 
would find these distinctions meaningful enough to reach a different 
conclusion than the court did in Herring. 
B. Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) likely makes an institution of 
the United States liable for permission claims against federal 
government employees if the permission occurs in Oregon and is 
within the scope of the employee’s office or employment.321 However, 
there are procedural requirements and many exceptions to consider.  
First turning to the FTCA’s unique procedural requirements, the 
plaintiff must submit her claim to the government agency within two 
315 OR. REV. STAT. § 31.710(1). 
316 Id. § 30.271(2)–(3). 
317 Id. § 31.710(1). 
318 See Herring, 255 Or. App. at 323, 297 P.3d at 14–15. 
319 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.271(2)–(3). 
320 Compare Act of Apr. 8, 2009, ch. 67, §§ 3–5, 2009 Or. Laws 1–4 (codified at OR. 
REV. STAT. §§ 30.271–73) (enacting OTCA damages cap provisions), with Act of May 15, 
2003, ch. 211, § 1, 2003 Or. Laws 1 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 124.100) (enacting treble 
damages provision).  
321 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012) (“Claims against the United States, for money 
damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal 
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the 
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances 
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance 
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”). 
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years after the claim’s accrual.322 That agency then has six months to 
respond before the plaintiff can file her complaint in court.323 If the 
agency denies the claim, the plaintiff must file her complaint in court 
within six months of the denial notice’s mailing.324 If the agency fails 
to deny the claim, the plaintiff must file her complaint within six years 
after accrual begins.325 Further, the plaintiff must bring her claim in 
federal court.326 Finally, only bench trials are allowed.327 
Next, the FTCA’s many exceptions may prevent a permission claim 
against the federal government, depending upon the facts. For example, 
abuse in a foreign country is exempt, even if the permission occurs in 
Oregon.328 The FTCA also has an exception for claims “arising out of” 
battery.329 A court could apply this exception to bar an FTCA claim for 
permission because proving permission requires proof of abuse, and 
the permission claim could therefore arise out of battery. However, 
federal courts in Oregon might not apply the exception in this way 
because of precedent in the Ninth Circuit on an analogous issue—viz., 
negligently permitting a battery.330 When the batterer is a government 
employee, the Ninth Circuit doesn’t apply the exception.331 Moreover, 
when the batterer is not a government employee, the exception does not 
apply in any jurisdiction.332 Therefore, in Oregon, whether the abuser 
is a government employee or not, the exception is unlikely to bar an 
FTCA claim for permitting abuse of a vulnerable person because of the 
precedent on negligently permitting battery claims. Jurisdictions 
outside the Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, could apply the exception 
when the underlying abuse is committed by a government employee 
because those jurisdictions are not bound by the Ninth Circuit 
precedent.333 Therefore, to the extent that permission claims could be 
322 Id. § 2401(b). 
323 Id.; DOBBS, supra note 5, § 335. 
324 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). 
325 Id. § 2401. 
326 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 335. 
327 Id.  
328 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) 
(“[T]he FTCA's foreign country exception bars all claims based on any injury suffered in a 
foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission occurred.”). 
329 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). 
330 Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir. 1995); Bennett v. United States, 
803 F.2d 1502, 1505 (9th Cir. 1986). 
331 Brock, 64 F.3d at 1425; Bennett, 803 F.2d at 1505. 
332 United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 165–66 (1963). 
333 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 341. 
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brought in another circuit, the government may be exempt from 
liability because of the battery exception. 
The discretionary decisions exception could also be relevant to a 
permission claim against the federal government.334 To oversimplify a 
complicated legal issue, the exception applies when the government 
employee’s conduct is left to his judgment and the judgment itself is 
susceptible to policy analysis.335 In other words, if the government 
employee could have balanced different decisions that he was 
authorized to make, the exception will apply and protect the 
government from FTCA liability. Therefore, the exception could bar a 
permission claim against the federal government when the conduct 
constituting permission was susceptible to policy analysis and 
committed by a government employee with the discretion to make such 
policy decisions. 
The treble damages provision of the vulnerable person statute may 
or may not apply to a damages award against the federal government. 
The federal government is not liable for punitive damages.336 The 
treble damages provision is not considered punitive for the purposes of 
Oregon law,337 but the issue is still undecided for the purposes of the 
FTCA. For purposes of the FTCA, punitive damages are “damages 
recognized under traditional common law as punitive, which are 
generally damages that depend on proof of intentional or egregious 
misconduct and for which the purpose is to punish.”338 A federal court 
could find that an abuse of a vulnerable person claim requires proof of 
intentional or egregious misconduct because it requires proof of, well, 
abuse of a vulnerable person. But the treble damages award itself 
doesn’t require a heightened level of culpability,339 and the purpose of 
the award is not to punish.340 Accordingly, a federal court should treble 
any award of economic or noneconomic damages against the federal 
334 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (excepting FTCA claims based on a government employee’s 
“exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or 
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the 
discretion involved be abused”). 
335 United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322–25 (1991) (quoting Berkovitz v. United 
States, 486 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1988); United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 813 
(1984)). 
336 28 U.S.C. § 2674. 
337 Herring v. Am. Med. Response Nw., Inc., 255 Or. App. 315, 324–27, 297 P.3d 9, 
15–17 (2013). 
338 TORTS, supra note 172, § 28.3-12. 
339 Herring, 255 Or. App. at 324–25, 297 P.3d at 15–16. 
340 See supra Section II.B.2. 
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court in accordance with the treble damages provision in the vulnerable 
person statute.341  
CONCLUSION 
Abuse of a vulnerable person is a powerful cause of action that 
attorneys should use to seek redress for their clients who have been 
injured by date rape. As explored throughout this Comment, the 
vulnerable person statute offers vulnerable victims, such as victims of 
date rape, more favorable standards than the common law offers. In 
many ways, though, these more favorable standards seem to simply 
modernize the standard of consent. In my opinion, the optimal standard 
of consent has changed since the days of Prosser, and rightfully so: 
modern science has shown that some victims may be physically unable 
to communicate their lack of consent. Accordingly, a legal standard 
that lets a potential abuser operate on assumptions when a victim fails 
to express his lack of consent is unfair and not sufficiently protective 
in these cases. With this Comment, I have attempted to show how the 
vulnerable person statute can remedy this situation. Attorneys should 
use the vulnerable person statute to find remedies for clients who have 
suffered date rape. Attorneys should also continue to innovate and 
argue for more clear, just, and efficient standards of consent to apply 
in more classes of cases. 
341 See OR. REV. STAT. § 124.100(2) (2018) (explaining the treble damages provision in 
the abuse of a vulnerable person statute). 
